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CHAPTER ONE
"THE WORLD HAS NEVER APPEARED MORE HOPELESS OR HELPLESS"

Rwandan Horrors and the World's Inaction
Two mont �s after the outbreak ofgenocide in Rwanda, Boutros Boutros-Gali, the
Secretary General of the United Nations, declared: "We must recognize that ... we have failed
in our response to the agony ofRwanda, and thus have acquiesced in the continued loss of
human lives. Our readiness and capacity for action has been demonstrated to be inadequate at
best, and deplorable at worst, owing to the absence ofcollective political will."1 The United
States Ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright expresses similar frustration in her
autobiography, "I was not among the few who saw very early that the decade's most shocking
crimes would engulfthe small country ofRwanda. My deepest regret from my years as a public
servant is the failure of the United States and the international community to act sooner to halt
those crimes."2 These and other individuals in positions ofleadership during the genocide admit
responsibility for the failure ofthe international community and acknowledge regret for the
tragedy that occurred during their watch. Although both Boutros�Gali and Albright include
explanations of how the 1994 Rwandan genocide unfolded and why the international community
did not act, they do not attempt to excuse their actions. Rather, they acknowledge the horrifying
consequences ofthe genocide as well as the failure ofthe international community to stop it.

1

Quoted in Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian lnte1vention in International Society (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 230.
2
Madeline Albright, Madam Secretary (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), 147.
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This admission leads to difficult but important questions concerning how a repeat of these events
can be prevented in the future.
Diplomats from around the world attended the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 in an attempt to create a system that would
prevent horrors similar to the Holocaust from ever recur ring. Genocide was defined as "acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group. "3 The United Nations General Assembly unanimously passed a law declaring genocide a
crime against humanity. The Convention was adopted on December 9, 1948, and it was ratified
on October 16, 1950, thereby becoming official international law. According to this Convention,
the occurrence of genocide in a soverei gn state both permits and requires humanitarian
intervention on the part of the international community. Article I states, "The Contracting
Parties confim1 that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime
under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish.''4 Although it was decades
after the decision of the U.N. General Assembly, the United States ratified the genocide
convention in 1986. 5
In 1994, less than one year after the signing of the Anisha Accords, a treaty expected to
resolve the internal conflict in Rwanda, the Hutu ethnic group engaged in a massive genocide.
On the night of April 6, 1994, a plane carrying President Habyarimana of Rwanda and President
Ntaryamira of Burundi was shot down near the Kilgali airport. The Hutu-led government and
extremists blamed the events on Tutsi rebels, even though many thought that the crime had been

Article I of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Ibid.
5
The reluctance of the United States centered on the objection that it may interfere with U.S. state sovereignty.
Opponents feared that it could be applied retroactively, or too broadly and apply to domestic affairs. These criticism
were unfounded, however, and President Reagan backed the Convention in 1985, which led to its 1986 ratification
by the Senate. The final step was the 1988 passage of the Genocide Implementation Act.
3

4

2

committed by Hutu extremists, a theory that has since been supported by evidence. Hutu
activists put roadblocks up by the next morning and they began killing the Tutsis and moderate
Hutus immediately. Linda Melvern describes the carefully planned slaughter: ''Simultaneously,
in a swift operation, moderate politicians and members of Rwanda's thriving pro-democracy and
human rights movement-everyone who had spoken out for democracy, Hutus and Tutsis
alike-were murdered. The lists of victims, written on index cards, had been neatly stored in
wooden boxes on metal library shelves." 6
In 100 days, Hutus slaughtered at least 800,000 of their fellow Rwandan citizens, the
Tutsis. 7 Although the United Nations had peacekeeping forces on the ground to enforce the
Arusha Accords, it withdrew the majority of these troops and labeled the conflict a civil war, not
genocide. The world became increasingly aware that the civil war was in actuality genocide, but
the United Nations and other bodies failed to act with the speed that would have enabled
effective intervention. Journalist Philip Gourevitch clarifies the difference between civil war and
genocide. In a civil war, two forces are fighting each other. Civilians may or may not be
involved. In contrast, although genocide may have a political basis, the goal is to exterminate
the particular group in question. Gourevitch explains this distinction: "The idea [ of genocide] is
to eliminate what is perceived as a blood line ... In a civil war, a baby is not a serious enemy
element. Here, it is, because 60 years from now, that baby could be an adult."8 Alain Destexhe
confirms that in Rwanda, the entire Tutsi population was targeted. 9 The size and scope of the

6

Linda Melvern, "Genocide behind the Thin Blue Line," Security Dialogue 28, no. 3 (1997): 338.
While an exact death toll will never be known, Historian Gerald Prunier provides careful calculations to support
the 800,000 figure, which is approximately eleven percent of the Rwandan population. This number has since
become the accepted figure. The lowest reasonable estimate, offered by Alison Des Foiges, is 500,000, and the
highest is over a million.
8
Philip Gourevitch, interview, "The Triumph of Evil," Frontline PBS, January 26, 1999; available at PBS Online:
http://www. pbs.org/wgph/pages/frontline/shows/evil/etc/script.html.
9
Alain Destexhe, "The Third Genocide," Foreign Policy no. 97 (Winter 1995): 8.
7
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1994 genocide in Rwanda demonstrates a shocking failure of the international community to
uphold the standards created at the Convention and respond to crimes against humanity.
This chapter proceeds in the following manner. I begin by presenting the main
conclusions of the present literature on the international community's involvement in the
Rwandan genocide, and then I explain the importance of U.S. decisions and the need for a closer
analysis of the role of American citizens in influencing these decisions. Here, I develop this case
primarily by critically summarizing common explanations ofU.S. inaction. This establishes
arguments important to ensuing chapters, in which I make the case for U.S. citizen engagement
to pressure leaders to intervene to stop genocide.

Gaps in Current Scholarship
The Rwandan genocide has generated much scholarship in a relatively sh01i period of
time, as the disastrous consequences of the decisions and non-decisions made by the
international community led scholars and politicians alike to search for an explanation. Literature
on the subject tends to label the problem as a failure of the United Nations to ca1ry out its
responsibilities. The United States' powerful influence in the U.N. and its ac6ve discouragement
of intervention make it another primary target for blame. In their respective portrayals of the
disaster, analysts often invoke the memory of the Holocaust and the supposed desire of the
Western world to prevent its recurrence. Gourevitch condemns Westem actors, "The West's
post-Holocaust pledge that genocide would never again be tolerated proved to be hollow, and for
all the fine sentiments inspired by the memory of Auschwitz, the problem remains that
denouncing evil is a far cry from doing good." 10 The parallels between the Rwandan genocide
Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families (New York:
Picador USA, 1998), 170.
10
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and the Holocaust make the events in Rwanda even more shocking, since by the 1990s most
assumed the world was better prepared to act against these crimes than it was in the 1930s and
1940s.
The scholarly literature concerning Rwanda specifically and humanitarian intervention
generally tends to focus on the role of political leaders in both t he United Nations and the United
States. The importance of public opinion is emphasized, but almost always as a result of the
opinions and decisions of positional leaders. Most authors blame the failure of leadership on the
absence of political will. Often forgotten is the silence of the American public, except as a result
ofleaders' inaction. In an ideal representative democracy, political will comes from the need for
political leaders to meet the interests of the people who elect them. If a lack of political will
caused U.S. leaders to ignore the crisis in Rwanda, then the possibility exists that the situation
could be reversed and political capital could rely on action rather than inaction. Thus, American
citizens are important, active players in the equation, and as such, they deserve more attention.
My analysis focuses directly on the role of the American public, rather than the more
common approach of accentuating the role of political leaders. My reason for this focus is
threefold: first, the frequent placement of blame on the United States; second, the important role
of the 'average' citizen in a representative democratic system; and third, the moral obligations of
American citizens to members of other countries. This chapter develops the first point by
presenting the most prevalent explanations of U.S. inaction and the resultant reasons for which it
is often the most criticized actor. The second and third rationales for the focus on the American
public will be introduced here and are main themes that will be expanded throughout the
remainder of the paper. The importance of American citizens is a subject of detailed analysis in
Chapters Two and Three, in which I argue that citizen advocacy holds the greatest potential to

5

make the democratic system more responsive and therefore better able to react effectively to
events like the Rwandan genocide. Likewise, Chapters Four and Five expand on the idea of
effective followership as it relates to citizen advocacy and the duty of Americans to citizens of
other countries.

Statement of Assumptions
The argument that American citizens have made a difference in US policy decisions
regarding Rwanda assumes two distinct claims about the Rwandan genocide to be true: first,
humanitarian intervention in Rwanda would have been justified; and. second, it was both
possible and would have been effective. Both claims are widely accepted and supported by
scholarly accounts of the event, and with the benefit of hindsight, by many political leaders who
failed to act at the time. The establishment of such claims makes it difficult to argue that the
international community was not able to help the Rwandans.
The claim that humanitarian intervention would have been justified in this case is a
common starting point for most accounts of the Rwandan genocide. Scholars and politicians
now agree that a violation of Rwanda's state sovereignty would have been acceptable given the
situation. These persons reason that states are bound to uphold certain basic responsibilities to
their citizens, and that any state engaging in gross violations of human rights fails to fulfill this
duty and loses its right to sovereignty. International law, as established by the Genocide
Convention and ratified by two-thirds of the member states, supports the case that an
international body such as the United Nations could have intenrened in Rwanda and would have
been justified in doing so. Eric Heizne explains that genocide, crimes against humanity. and
certain war crimes make the use of force, normally illegal, legal: "Crimes that are subject to
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universal jurisdiction are considered intolerable by international law ... These crimes are
considered ... to be such an affront to human dignity that it is incumbent upon states. to see that
th�y are prosecuted, regardless of where they occur.,,i 1 The genocide in Rwanda most certainly
fits into this special category.
My next assumption, perhaps slightly more contested but still widely accepted, is that the
United States, with the support of the United Nations, could have taken actions that would have
stopped, or, at the very least, significantly lessened the killings of the Tutsis. Some argue that
the U.N., or another multilateral force, should have led the humanitarian intervention, and the
U.N. is therefore more blameworthy than the U.S. Others assert that the U.S. should have been
the primary actor in the intervention. Either way, the important point is that a legitimate actor
could have taken steps that would have lessened the genocide. This assumption is supported by
two separate conditions.
The first condition is that the international community had the means by which to
intervene. In order to be able to intervene effectively, either the United States, the United
Nations, or a different nation or multilateral organization would have needed knowledge of and
information about the genocide as it unfolded, as well as the proper equipment and monetary
support. Three authors exploring the blameworthiness of the various actors have made parallel
arguments along these lines. Michael Barnett, in his account Eyewitness to Genocide, and Linda
Melvern, in her history A People Betrayed, focus on the U.N. 's failure. Samantha Power, in her
book A Problem From Hell, analyzes it as a failure by the leadership of the United States. All
three agree that the international community had knowledge of the genocide, even if it did not
admit to or acknowledge the severity of the problem. In addition, all three authors agree that
11 Eric Heizne, "Waging War for Human Rights: Toward a Moral-Legal Theory of Humanitarian Intervention,"
Human Rights and Human. Welfare 3 (2003): 91.
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even if the United States did not have the necessary information, the reason for this absence was
purposeful rather than excusable ignorance. 12 Based on these accounts, it would seem, then, that
the international community did have enough information and resources to launch a
humanitarian intervention.
The second claim of this assumption is that humanitarian intervention would have made a
difference. At the outbreak of genocide, General Romeo Dallaire, head of the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Rwanda, requested 5,000 troops, a relatively small number that would not
have presented a great burden economically or militarily. Dallaire thinks that, in the early stages,
as little as one battalion (about 800 people) could have secured Kigali, Rwanda's capital, because
the killings began there and then spread to the rest of the country. 13 While he requested 5,000
troops, he believes that he could have halted the genocide with 1,800, in addition to an expanded
mandate and necessary equipment. 14 Scott Feil conducted a research panel that concluded that
5,000 peacekeepers could have saved a half million Rwandans. 15 Researchers note that this force
would have had the greatest chance of success if offered in mid-April, when the perpetrators
were still cautious about international opinion and genocide was not yet widespread. 16
The most commonly referenced support for these predictions is the ability of the
relatively small force of United Nations peacekeepers during the outbreak of the genocide to
maintain some order and prevent killings in their presence. The killings escalated immediately
following the peacekeepers' departure from Rwanda. Destexhe and Power point out that Tutsis
12

I offer further support for this claim in Chapter 2, during the discussion of when the i nternational community
knew that events in Rwanda properly fit under the term genocide.
13
General Romeo Dallair e, "A Good Man in Hell," interview by Ted Koppel, United States Holocaust Museum,
Washington, DC June 12, 2002; available at http:www.ushmm.org/conscience/events/Dallaire/dalliare.php.
14
Holly Burkhalter, "The Question of Genocide: The Clinton Administration and Rwanda," World Policy Journal
XI (1994): 47.
15
Colonel Scott Feil, "Could 5,000 Peacekeepers have saved 500,000 Rwandans?: Early Intervention
Reconsidered," Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, vol. III. no. 2 (April 1997).
16
Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 223.
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were grouped together, which would have made it easier for U.N. forces to protect many lives at
once. 17 The story of a Senegalese captain saving hundreds of lives single-handedly confirms
these predictions. Power explains: "The Hutu were generally reluctant to massacre large groups
of Tutsi if foreigners (armed or unarmed) were present. It did not take many U.N. soldiers to
dissuade the Hutu from attacking." 18 These explanations and anecdotal evidence strengthen the
assertions by General Dallaire and others that a relatively small force could have stopped the
genocide. Several analysts, including Power, Barnett, and Jamie Metzl argue that even actions
short of military intervention, such as jamming the radios used to spread anti-Tutsi propaganda,
would have lessened or perhaps even ended the killings. 19 Evidence suggesting that it was
possible to lessen or halt the genocide undercuts the argument for dismissing the case on the
claim that the international community could not h ave done anything.
The importance of these first two basic assumptions is that they narrow the range of
possible explanations and justifications for inaction during the genocide. As the various
accounts of the genocide prove, it would be difficult to argue successfully that intervention was
either unjustified or logistically impossible. Therefore, the discussion of the Rwandan genocide
can start with the assumption that action was possible, thus making the question of why the
international community did not act all the more important and challenging.

Explanations of the Failure of the United States
Although the blameworthiness of the U.N. and the U.S. are often discussed
interchangeably, my focus is on the responsibility of the United States. In the case of Rwanda,

17 Destexhe, 9; Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy
Happen," The Atlantic (September 2001), 18.
18
Power, 2001, 18.
19
I return to the radio-jamming case in Chapter Three.
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the United States is particularly responsible because of its power and influence in the United
Nations and because its resistance to intervention is frequently cited as the reason for which the
United Nations did not intervene. Barnetl takes a position that many scholars support. He points
out that the United States has a permanent seat on the Security Council, which grants it
responsibility for concerns of both national and international peace and security. 20 He writes,
"The most powerful states bear more responsibility because they have the capacity to do more
and they sit on authoritative councils that profoundly shape the scope ofhumanitaiianism."21
While I do not believe that other states should escape responsibility, I do think that holding the
United States to high standards is both acceptable a nd necessary.
Another reason that many accounts of the international community's response place the
most blan1e on the United States is because of its status as the most outspoken opponent to
humanitarian intervention during the crisis. Gourevitch's claim illustrates the commonly shared
viewpoint: "The desertion of Rwanda by the U.N. force ... can be credited almost single
handedly to the United States.''22 Even if this claim is overstated, it does suggest why actions of
the United States are so heavily criticized and what can be done to prevent such disastelrs from
occurring in the future. By using the United States as a focus, I can deal with the actor most
closely tied to the failure of the international community. An examination of the factors most
frequently cited as explanations for the inaction of the United States creates a helpful framework
for understanding the important role of American citizens in U.S. policy decisions.
If one accepts the argument that U.S.domestic politics were a main reason for the
international community's failure to halt the genocide, then two main options for improvement

20

Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2002), 172.
21
Ibid., 180�181.
22
Gourevitch, 150.
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become evident. The first would be to change the system of international governance to try to
remove genocide from the realm of domestic politics. The second is to work within t11e domestic
political system in a manner that would allow for an increased concern for genocide in the future.
I believe the second approach is more practical, as it works within the framework created by the
current political system of sovereign states. I acknowledge the limitations of the democratic
political system and suggest strategies to expand the boundaiies of US national interests in the
future. While I do not dismiss the possibility of eventual reform of the international political
system, I am deliberately choosing to work within the framework of changing the domestic
political system in the hope that this will generate more immediate positive change.
Assignment of blame for U.S. reluctance to act in Rwanda typically falls on those in
formal positions of leadership at the time, including President Clinton and his administration,
Pentagon officials, and members of Congress. Melvern observes: "The Rwandan genocide
should have been the defining scandal of the presidency of Bill Clinton ... But the
administration took the easy option and failed to push the moral boundaries; there were no votes
to be gained advocating help for another collapsed African state."23 Wheeler makes a similar
assertion, "Accepting that such an intervention depended crucially upon U.S. leadership and
capabilities, the buck stops at the door ofClinton's White House." 24 These interpretations,
which are supported by many other critics who anive at similar conclusions, emphasize the
importance ofUnited States leadership. I do not deny the importance ofleaders in positions of
direct responsibility. However, I hope to use these and similar assessments of the inaction of the
United States to explore U.S. domestic political dynamics more fully.

Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide (New York: Zed Books, 2000),
229.
24
Wheeler, 239.

23
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Why did political leaders fail in their responsibilities? How can this failure be prevented
in the future? My answer to such questions-to be developed in the arguments of this thesis-is
that the silence of individual American citizens played a determining role in the inaction of the
United States during the Rwandan genocide. One of the most cited reasons for the failure is the
absence of political will, which, in a democratic system, stems at least partially from public
opinion. If the inaction came from the silence of the American public, working within the
system to increase political will offers the best chance at improving the system in the future.
This is a solution that has not yet been thoroughly investigated. Madeline Alblight asserts, "The
world has taken a number of steps to make future Rwandas,less likely, but added together they
do not equal in importance to the fundamental question of political will."25 Power's desc1iption
of the relationship between politicians and public opinion reveals the important role of American
citizens. The American system depends on leaders acting both in response to, and out of fear of,
public opinion. However, the very leaders listening to the public are the individuals who play a
fonnative role in shaping public opinion. Power observes, "American leaders have both a
circular and deliberate relationship to public opinion." 26 This observation is st1pp01ied by her

description of the processes by which political leaders make decisions. Officials wait for citizens
to voice their concerns before taking action, as they want to be sure that they have the necessary
support before moving forward. However, oftentimes, citizens are not aware of problems

happening across the globe unless leaders draw attention to them. Thus, the circle is closed,
neither side acts, nothing is accomplished and agency is not established. We must find a way to
enable the American public to break free from that closed circle.

25
26

Albright, 155.
Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 509.
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U.S. Inaction Explained
Explanations of U.S. policy decisions before, dming, and after the genocide typically fall
under one or more of several categories: compassion, information, national interests, and
historical context. The low status of the Rwandan crisis within the U.S. government and among
the American public can be attributed to a combination of these four factors. These categories are
by no means completely separate from each other, of course. For example, a lack of compassion
and difficulty identifying with the victims has direct connections to the assumptions of tribal
conflict that grew from the lack of country-specific knowledge. Wheeler explains, "The selective
gaze of humanitarianism in the West relates not only to how human suffering is constmcted, but
also to the locations that become the site of attention."27 This statement references the closely
linked variables that are involved in decisions determining which countries receive attention
from the international community.

The Limits of Compassion
The first explanation of U.S. inaction is the argument that both policy decisions and
public opinion are affected on some level, perhaps even subconsciously, by the ability of
individuals to identify with and feel compassion for other individuals. The discrepancies between
the perceived relative worth of citizens of different countries and races and ethnicities became
apparent in the Rwandan case. Political leaders admit the fact t hat the country in question was a
remote African nation made decisions to ignore the genocide easier to justify. In late May of
1994, a British House Delegate, Tony Worthington, remarked, "It is inconceivable that an
atrocity in which a half million white people had died would not have been extensively debated

27

Wheeler, 308.
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in the House."28 The difference between the value of Americans and of Rwandans is revealed in
a U.S. officer's comment, who told General Dallaire, "We are doing our calculations back here
and one American casualty is worth about 85,000 Rwandan dead."29 It could be argued that
there are legitimate political reasons (according to current American attitudes) for U.S. political
leaders to value American casualties over deaths of citizens of another country. Nevetiheless,
this comment is troubling.
If the same crimes had occurred in a European country, would the U.S. army officer still
have used the ratio of one American death to 85,000 European deaths? Power repeatedly points
out the hidden yet determinant role that American biases toward people of certain nationalities or
ethnicities play in shaping U.S. policy. She shares General Dallaire's illustration of the
difference between explaining numbers of Rwandans killed and numbers of Europeans killed. He
believes the response would have been much greater if the expectation was that 50,000
Europeans were going to die, stating, "racism slips in so it changes our expectations." 30 These
analogies reveal the Western tendency to assume Ame1ican or European lives are far more
important than the lives of African citizens. Clearly, the low status of Rwandans in the minds of
Westerners influenced their reactions to the genocide.
These biases were not restricted to the policy decisions of U.S. officials. Preconceived
notions of the superiority of Western citizens similarly affected the 'average' American citizen.
This phenomenon may present even more of a problem than the idea that politicians make such
stark calculations, as citizens cannot justify this stance on the grounds that it is necessary for
U.S. political or military power as easily as politicians can.

28

Quoted in Melvern, 2000, 232.
Quoted in Samantha Power, 2002, 3 81.
30
Quoted in Power, 2002, 350.
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In "Compassion and Terror," Martha Nussbaum links the failure to intervene in Rwanda
to the present limits of compassion. She compares American's reactions to Rwanda with the
events of September 11 th, 2001, "When disaster struck in Rwanda, we did not similarly extend
concern ... because there was no antecedent basis for it: suffering Rwandans could not be seen
as the larger •us' for whose fate we trembled."31 Nussbaum connects the sense of identity of
American citizens and their self-interests with their level of compassion, arguing that if they
could identify with or were more affected by the events in Rwanda, then they would feel more
compassion and thus be more inclined to act. General Dallaire expresses his frustration with the
world's lack of compassion for the Rwandans: "I believe today if some outfit decided to go into
Rwanda and eliminate the 320-odd [silver-back] mountain gorillas that ... there would be today
more of an effort, more of an involvement by people just like you and me and many others than
there would be if they're slaughtering [Rwandans] again by the thousands in that same
country."32 This comparison reflects the influence that compassion plays in determining an
individual's response (or lack of response) to a problem.
One possible reason for this prioritizing of certain individuals and groups over others is
the idea that the more removed the victim is from the individual, the more difficulty he or she
has imagining and feeling compassion for the victim. Elaine Scarry asserts that our imagination
of others helps determine the actions we take toward them. 33 She shares the idea of Bertrand
Russell, who suggested that Westerners should read the newspaper and change the name of
countries to see how much they are shaped by these factors. Suppose that the Rwandan genocide
were occurring in England ("200,000 Slaughtered in London"). One can safely assume that the
31

Nussbaum, "Compassion and Terror," Daedalus: Proceedings of the American Academy ofArts and Sciences
132, no. 1 (2003): 16.
32
Dallaire, interview by Ted Koppel.
33
Elaine Scarry, "The Difficulty oflmagining Other People," in Martha Nussbaum and Joshua Cohen, ed., For Love
of Country? {Boston: Beacon Press, 2002): 102-106.
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world's response would have been quite different, especially in the United States. It is only after
becoming aware of these biases that individuals can begin to assess them and decide their moral
worth, a project I will undertake with my discussion of the appropriate duty of American
citizens.

Information and Misinformation
A related possible reason for the failure of the United States to intervene was the lack of
accurate information during the genocide from individuals knowledgeable about Rwanda and its
history. One outgrowth of this was the assumption made by various government branches, the
media, and the American public that the violence was "normal tribal conflict," implying that it
was not shocking or even troubling. Samuel Makinda explains that the classification ofHutus
and Tutsis as separate, identifiable etlmic groups is itself somewhat problematic, "The Rwandan
conflict had much more to do with the misguided policies of the post-independence leaders,
dictatorial rule and etlmic competition between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis."34
Belgians, the primary colonizers of Rwanda, forced Rwandans to carry identification cards. The
classification was based more on wealth than on ethnicity: the minority Tutsis were the elitist
cattle owners whom the Belgians placed in leadership roles, while the majority Hutus were the
farmers. Violence in Burundi, a neighboring country also populated by Hutus and Tutsis, which
in October 1993 led to the deaths of 40,000 people, played a role in the "blindness bred by
familiarity" argument. 35 When the Rwandan genocide broke out, officials mistakenly believed it
would be a similar type of ethnic violence.

34

Samuel Makinda, "U.N. Peacekeeping in Africa," in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, A Crisis of
Expectations: U.N. Peacekeeping in the I 990 's (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 110.
35
Power, 2001, 10.
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At the time, the world's general perception of Africa as a place of much tribal fighting
interfered with the recognition of the genocide. Wheeler hints at the volitional aspect of
cognitive mistakes, a connection I return to in Chapters Three and Four: "It is comforting for
those of us who live in the West to think that what happened in Rwanda was the result of ancient
tribal hatreds; that the orgy of violence that consumed Rwanda is an African phenomenon that
we could do very little about ... The fact is that this genocide, like that of the Holocaust, was the
product of deliberate political design. " 36 He criticizes Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali
for framing his reports in terms of a tribal war, despite the communication of General Dallaire
and the Human Rights Watch, both of which portrayed it as a genocide. 37 Wheeler believes that
Boutros-Gali's representing the violence in this manner helped support the decisions of the
Security Council to refrain from intervening. Power explains that even regional specialists
believed the violence to be a normal outgrowth of tribal or ethnic conflict. 38 The fact that even
regional specialists stereotyped the violence as "normal" reveals that the lack of country-specific
knowledge allowed the conflict to be misrepresented.
Because the media are such an important source of information, flaws in media coverage
can have repercussions that damage the ability of the public and the government to grasp fully
and respond appropriately to international crises. The media's somewhat problematic portrayal
of the Rwandan conflict had a significant impact on the representation of the conflict among the
Clinton administration and the American public. Flaws included inaccurate information,
inadequate information, and coverage that was not as extensive as the severity of the massacre
would seem to warrant. A relatively brief analysis of the media's role during the genocide is
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helpful to the present discussion and will be useful information for the discussion in later
chapters.
The most noticeable characteristic of inaccurate representation was the portrayal of
violence as typical to Africa. Power indicates that this trend did occur in the coverage of
Rwanda: "Not all the reporting helped clarify the nature of the violence for the outside world. If
all the reports portrayed the killing as extensive, many also treated the violence as typical. "39
Peter Jakobsen names this a common problem in media coverage of international conflicts. 40
The steady coverage of crises creates a public impression that areas such as Africa have constant
and unsolvable problems. This is particularly relevant to the U.S. inaction during the Rwandan
genocide, as it helps explain why citizens were not more alarmed and demanding of action. It
also supp01ts Power's argument that outsiders assumed the violence was typical of the African
country. The media's representation of the violence as typical tribal warfare prevented the
American public from fully grasping the scope and severity of the genocide as it unfolded.
A lack of knowledge and information about Rwanda also led the media to focus too
heavily on the U.S. response, rather than on the details of the problems in Rwanda. Jon Western
(in reference to Somalia) points out this tendency: "Because of a lack ofresources, expertise, and
access to a particular conflict, the media often focuses [sic] attention on the United States policy
response and reporting from Washington."41 During the genocide, this made it more difficult for
Americans to question U.S. policies and realize that they were not sufficient
Media coverage was problematic, but nonetheless it was sufficient enough to alert those
paying careful attention that the problems in Rwanda were serious and deserving of further
39
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consideration. For their part, U.S. leaders most certainly had enough information to prevent
flawed media coverage from being an acceptable excuse. Alison Des Forges confirms this
viewpoint, arguing that although press coverage was not excellent, there was enough evidence
for those working in the Clinton administration to realize that the Tutsis were being
systematically massacred. 42 Jakobsen also supports this view, stating that despite some media
pressure, the Western governments did not respond to the early warnings because they lacked the
requisite "political will," not because they were unaware of the problems.43 The assumptions
made by those in positions ofleadership directly tied to the handling of diplomacy and media
representation influenced the American citizens' understandings of the violence in Rwanda, as
they were led to make similar assumptions.
Although U.S. leaders most likely had more access to infonnation than did the average
American, citizens still had enough information at their disposal to make a properly informed
assessment of the situation in Rwanda. If the American public was not aware of the genocide
and could not have been expected to be, then its inaction could be excused and its role would
take a much lower priority than that of the media. However, Power and others carefully establish
that the American public along with the Clinton administration did indeed have sufficient
information to understand that Rwanda was experiencing genocide. Power refutes President
Clinton's after-the-fact explanation that the world did not appreciate the genocide, stating that,
even if this explanation is accurate, it is not an excuse: "Survivors and witnesses had trouble
making the unbelievable believable. Bystanders were thus able to retreat to the 'twilight
between knowing and not knowing.' But this is not an alibi. We are responsible for our
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incredulity. "44 On the topic of the media, she asse1ts, "Still, for all the flaws in coverage, the
major media gave anybody reading or watching cause for grave alarm."45 Notice that in both
statements Power does not confine her assertion to those within the government-rather, by
using language such as "we" and "anybody," she suggests that the typical American citizen
could (and should) have known. Thus, in the case of Rwanda, media coverage can be
established as having provided the necessary information for humanitarian response.
Explanations for the failure of the United States to act lay elsewhere (or at least not primarily
with the media).
In addition, media coverage is, on some level, an indication of the interests of the
American public. Michael Ignatieff argues that the biased nature of television coverage is simply
a reflection of its audience, "It may be the case that television cannot create any moral
relationship between the audience and the victim where none exists already. If television's gaze
is partial and promiscuous, it is because ours is no less so. The TV crews go where we were
already looking."46 This observation relates the flaws in the media coverage to the misguided
perspectives of American citizens. This returns us to the need to examine the influence of
citizens.

National Interests

The third explanation for U.S. inaction during the genocide is the absence of specific,
tangible national interests in Rwanda such as political or economic concerns. The absence of
such interests made Rwanda a low priority among both American political leaders and the
44
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American public. Power points this out through her observation that there was never a top-level
meeting of U.S. political or military leaders focused specifically on the problem in Rwanda. 47
Wheeler also credits the failure of the international community to intervene to the prioritizing of
narrow national interests over those of the Rwandan citizen's. 48 Both Anthony Lake, the
national security adviser, and President Clinton explained the inaction of the United States by
stating that the U.S. did not have vital interests in Rwanda and could not be expected to solve
every problem in the world.49 A remark b y Bob Dole, then Senate minority leader, after the
successful withdrawal of American forces from Rwanda reveals the priority of domestic
interests: "I don't think we have any national interest there. "50 These statements illustrate the
narrow understanding of national interests under which politicians and their staff were working.
Rwanda was kept at its low status because of the absence of direct connections that would link
its internal affairs more closely with U.S. national interests.
The United States does have a vested national interest in following international law. To
fail to do so would, over time, hurt the credibility of the United States. However, in the case of
Rwanda, the U.S. worked within a much more restricted framework. One contributing factor
was the lack of concern for Rwandans among the other powerful nations. This allowed the
national interest to uphold one's political obligations to be viewed as a lesser concern.
This lack of attention can be at least partially explained by the absence of political costs.
Power makes this connection: "Rwanda guaranteed no sense of urgency and could be safely
avoided at no political cost."51 Politicians realized that their actions in Rwanda would not have a
measurable effect on the opinions of their constituents toward them. Officials working for
47 Power, 2002, 366.
48
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elected politicians, such as mid-level and senior officials in the State Department, although not
bound to the interests of constituents, still worked within the assumption that the United States
would not take action. This explanation opens the possibility for a solution that works within the
framework of political costs and benefits. The statements above are made from the perspective
of politicians and policy makers. However, they were able to make them because public opinion
would not be adversely affected by inaction. This connection will be returned to in the following
chapter.
Wheeler criticizes Western countries for allowing narrow national interests to have such
an influence on their policies, "It was the refusal of Westem govemments to accept this cost
[risking soldiers when no direct strategic or economic interests involved] that was the obstacle to
humanitarian intervention in Rwanda." 52 Nigeria's Ambassador Gambari points out that this
type of policy-making reflects the double standard of showing much more concem for Europe
than Africa. 53 National interests have a legitimate role in U.S. policy decisions. The problem is
that they were defined so narrowly that they excluded action in the face of genocide.

Historical Context
A final explanation for the inaction of the United States is also related to the idea of
political costs and benefits: the historical context of the time played an imp01iant role in the
decisions of the United States government. After the end of the Cold War, the United Nation
increased in both scope and prominence. During the early 1990's, the U.N. had forces in twenty
four countries. Member states began to complain about the funds required for this mission and
urged the United Nations to scale back its peacekeeping efforts. The United States was
52
53

Wheeler, 241.
Barnett, 127.

22

particularly outspoken in this regard, insisting that the U.N. not spread itself and its resources too
thin. The status of the United States as the world's only remaining superpower made its position
especially powerful.
At the time of the Rwandan genocide, the most relevant crisis shaping the vision of the
Clinton administration, Congress, and the American public was the recent intervention in
Somalia. Events there further called into question the post-Cold War trend toward the expansion
of the United Nations and its peacekeeping efforts. The fall of Somali warlord Siad Barre's
government in 1991 triggered a downward spiral of events in the divided country as opposing
clans fought for powe r and control over crucial resources such as humanitarian aid. The
disappearance of a central state, accornpanied by increasing violence and population movement,
helped create a famine in some regions of Sornalia. The famine continued into 1992, when in
August President George Bush began Operation Provide Relief and airlifted food into the
country. In November 1992 this effort was extended to a United States military deployment
( Operation Restore Hope) with the aim of protecting and assisting relief agencies in the
distribution of food. Operation Restore Hope ended abruptly when, on October 3, 1993, Somalis
shot down a Blackhawk helicopter, killing eighteen American soldiers. The resultant prime�time
media coverage included gruesome footage of a dead U.S. soldier being dragged through the
streets of Mogadishu while Somalis cheered. The events embarrassed the U.S. government and
incited a public U.S. outcry. Citizens questioned why the United States was providing help in
areas that were hostile to Americans. President Clinton immediately announced a six-month
plan for a complete withdrawal of American forces.
Scholars stress the formative role this disaster had on shaping the Clinton
administration's vision of humanitarian efforts. Even those who had fully supported U.S. efforts
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in Somalia reneged on these ideals, "With Somalis dragging dead soldiers in the streets of
Mogadishu and congressional offices receiving about three hundred calls a day from angry
constituents, no one was willing to support the U.S. mission."54 The Clinton administration
became acutely aware of the possible risks involved in peacekeeping. An important distinction,
though, is the fact that while Somalia and Rwanda were lumped together because of their
location in Africa, their situations were very different on many levels. One historian explains,
"[Diplomats] seemed unable to dissociate Rwanda from Somalia, although the two cases had few
points of comparison beyond their common location on the African continent."55 The
administration's inaccurate portrayal contributed to the failure of the United States to recognize
the Rwandan genocide for what it was and act to stop it in an appropriate timetable.
The dominant beliefs of Republicans in Congress during the Clinton administration also
played a key role in shaping the perspective of the administration. Even before the crisis that
spelled the end of U.S. involvement in Somalia, President Clinton was careful to argue for
refonns that would please those members of Congress who sought to lessen the power and
control of the United Nations. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in
September 1993, Clinton spoke of his support for the U.N. but also emphasized the need to make
reforms that would result in a more careful selection process of peacekeeping missions. 56
Michael Barnett's analysis of the role of the United States in the United Nations points out the
importance of the anti-U.N. Congress in shaping the administration's views on Rwanda.
Clinton's conditional support for the U.N. tempered as a response to Republicans critical of the
institution. Following the events in Mogadishu, Congress placed even more pressure on Clinton
54
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to limit the U.S. 's role in the United Nations. Barnett portrays members of Congress as
"increasingly hostile" toward the U.N., pointing to financial considerations as their main source
of criticism. He takes the position, "While in principle the [Clinton administration] favored the
Rwandan operation, in practice it objected to any proposal that might give Congress yet another
opportunity to scmtinize Clinton's foreign policy."57 Barnett credits the anti-U.N. Congress with
the reason why the United States suggested such a small number of troops as an appropriate
number of peacekeepers in Rwanda after the outbreak of the genocide. The important role of
Congi·ess points to the potential of public opinion and voting to make a significant difference.
These contextual factors explain the perspective of the Clinton administration both before and
during the Rwandan genocide, which help to explain part of its hesitancy in consideting
intervention.

Concluding Thoughts and Points of Further Inquiry

Paul Kagame, the leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) during the genocide and
the current President of Rwanda,58 expressed his grave disappointment in the international
community, "The world has never appeared more hopeless or helpless. All those claiming to be
civilized had turned their backs. I knew that we were alone ...I developed contempt for those
people in the world who claimed to stand for the values of moral authority."59 This statement
correctly labels the world's treatment of Rwanda as an ethical failure. It is precisely this
occurrence that is so important: unless we can arrive at a suitable explanation for why we "tumed
our backs," we cannot be certain that we will respond differently if genocide were to break out
today.
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This chapter establishes the powerful role of United States policy decisions in the failure
of the international community to prevent or stop the Rwandan genocide. It also reveals the need
for further examination of the role of American citizens in influencing these decisions and their
outcomes. I plan to use and refine these arguments in the coming chapters in the hope that this
inquiry will help uncover tangible steps American citizens can take that will lead toward a more
promising future for those individuals facing the extreme situation of genocide.
Chapter Two explains the importance of the American public in determining the fate of
the Rwandans during the genocide. I expand upon the arguments presented above, showing
specific and tangible instances when either the voices or the silence of the public influenced U.S.
policy decisions. This discussion incorporates the appropriate role of the media in shaping, and
being shaped by, public opinion. In addition, it deals with the complexity of the democratic
system and the circular relationship between politicians and their constituents, in the context of
the decisions made during the Rwandan genocide.
Chapter Three argues that a focus on public opinion is not only necessary to prevent
future humanitarian disasters, but also that it is perhaps the best solution. I begin by exploring the
reasons behind the failure of the U.S. government, and I label some of these shmicomings as
problems inherent in our political system. I then show why I consider the American public to be
the agent most able to provide a promising solution. Individual citizens removed from direct role
responsibility do not have as much to risk by championing certain causes. They can avoid the
initial barrier that many politicians face of having to please all sides of the debate. In addition,
they are one step removed from the bureaucratic institution of the U.S. government, ?nd so have
a valuable perspective. By limiting reliance on persons whose jobs demand a somewhat narrow
view of self and national interests, the potential for increased compassion and action is expanded.
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Chapter Four offers suggestions for t11e furtherance of public concern and action in cases
of genocide in other countries. American citizens have a moral duty to act in the case of
genocide. Enlightened self-interest and increased compassion can act in support of the principle
of moral duty, but neither is sufficient in itself. The remoteness of Rwanda presents challenges in
trying to rise above the bias of national interests. Some argue that it could be overcome by an
expanded view of enlightened self-interest, in which every country is seen as a valuable piece of
the world market and therefore is important to powerful nations. Sadly, it seems that, although
Rwanda should be within the concern of these nations, the cmmtry's low political and economic
status give it much lower priority than many other countries of the world. Therefore, it would be
difficult for American politicians to see Rwanda as a global political and economic concern.
Similarly, increased compassion will help but not solve the problem in itself. It is for these
reasons that I place the most emphasis on establishing a moral duty. I appeal to both
deontological and consequentalist arguments, showing that each leads to the conclusion that
American citizens have a duty to help others in situations as dire as that of the Tutsis during the
genocide.
The final chapter, Chapter Five, draws together these various themes and offers
concluding thoughts regarding the future role of the United States and American citizens. I
expand on the implications of the arguments presented in the first four chapters and name the
lessons that Rwanda offers. The failure of the United States in Rwanda shows the importance of
compassionate and moral followership in addition to the need for thoughtful and responsible
leadership. Citizen advocacy is desperately needed to prevent such disasters from occurring in
the future.
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CHAPTER TWO
"MAKE MORE NOISE"

Rwanda is small, poor, and globally insignificant . . . Given the fact that there was no
political will, either in Washington or other capitals, to intervene, the American strategy
is to keep expectations as low as possible. Washington's thinking . . . [is} the number of
forces needed to stop [tribal warfare) would be too high for public opinion to accept.
There will be no political cost a t home for such an approach. 60
Iqbal Riza, deputy to Kofi Annan in the Department of Peacekeeping during the
Rwandan genocide, believes that the international community's slow response to et]mic
cleansing in Bosnia was not because the United Nations lacked the capacity to intervene, but
rather because the member states did not have sufficient incentive. He explains, "What was
lacking was the political will, which was m.ustered thi1iy years later when the situation had
reached a level where public opinion would not accept it. And that political will was also
lacking in Rwanda." 61 In this statement, Riza suggests direct causation between public opinion

and political will. Once public concern for Bosnia reached a certain level, international leaders

were forced to act. A lack of political will is the most common explanation of the failure of the
international community to intervene in Rwanda. It encompasses multiple factors and names the
fact that political leaders did not have enough incentive to intervene. The present chapter
examines the role that public opinion plays in dete1mining political will. If Riza' s connection
holds true, as I believe it does, and public opinion does contribute to political will, which in turn
leads to action, the role of American citizens becomes fundamental.
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Calculations of American public opinion exerted a powerful role on both the Clinton
administration's perspective during the Rwandan genocide and the policy decisions it made
during the genocide and the refugee crisis that followed. Samantha Power accurately portrays
the failure of the United States to intervene in Rwanda as stemming from the silence of the
Ame1ican people as well as the hesitancy of the Clinton administration to seek public criticism or
support: "U.S. officials were able to make potent political calculations about what the U.S.
public would abide. Officials simultaneously believed the American people would oppose U.S.
military intervention in central Africa and feared that the public might support intervention if
they realized genocide was underway. "62 The reluctant administration did not make decisions
without some degree of consideration of the predicted public reaction. The present chapter
analyzes the relationship between the various actors, using descriptions of the political climate
and examples of policies that show the role of public opinion. The stark contrast between the
inaction of the United States during the genocide and the humanitarian efforts during the refugee
crisis following the genocide illustrates the possibility of immediate action following public
demand, as well as the inaction that is possible in the absence of public demand.
The multitude of factors.that influenced the U.S. government's decisions during the 1994
Rwandan crisis are far too interrelated to delineate precisely. However, when these decisions are
examined from almost any angle, the American public is a constant force. The often-mentioned
but little-analyzed domestic pressure on the Clinton administration shaped its decisions, both
implicitly through influencing the paradigm through which it viewed the crisis as well as by
placing explicit restrictions on its actions. 63
62 Power, 2002, 373.
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Domestic pressure can be roughly traced to three main sources: Congress, the media, and
the American public. Each of these three actors influences, and is in turn influenced by, the
others. Throughout this chapter I will attempt to distinguish as carefully as possible among the
roles and the actions of each of the different actors, while realizing that none acted indepe11dently
of the others. In terms of ability to place domestic pressure on the Clinton administration,
Congress has perhaps the most direct role. The media also has a powerful influence on the
decisions of the executive branch. However, both Congress and the media draw their strength
from the American public: they are powerful in part because they are both representative of
public opinion and are seen as having an influence in determining public opinion. This chapter
focuses on the public but also includes some analysis of the role of Congress and the media, as a
discussion of the public without these components would neglect the importance of these actors.

Everything to Lose and Nothing to Gain?

An understanding of the perspective that the leaders of the Clinton administration brought
to the table in the spring of 1994 is crncial to uncovering the reasons for their decisions before,
during, and after the genocide. Fear of domestic political backlash led intervention in Rwanda to
be viewed as a politically risky move. Evidence illuminating the dominant role of the political
atmosphere on the administration's decisions in turn reveals the importance of the American
public.

Somalia Syndrome
As explained in Chapter One, the military intervention in Somalia, symbolized by a
naked American soldier being dragged through the streets in Mogadishu and b,roadcast on
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national television, created a political climate in which the American public was questioning the
appropriate role of the United States in interfering in distant countries. The events in Somalia
had a strong influence on the Clinton administration's perspective and actions during the
genocide. The reason behind this influence revolves around public opinion. The influence of
public opinion is revealed in two ways: first, Somalia was labeled a disaster because of public
outcry; second, the results of this public outcry are evident in how the Clinton administr ation
reacted to Rwanda.
The aftennath of Somalia affected the way political leaders and the American public
viewed future humanitarian efforts. Barnett emphasizes the impact of Somalia: "The events of
Mogadishu reverberated around the world and sent Washington into an apoplectic frenzy ... it is
virtually impossible to exaggerate the impact of Somalia on the U.N."64 Although Ban1ett
focuses on the United Nations, at the heart of Somalia's importance was its impact on the United
States, and its consequent impact 011 the U.N. The very reason for the fact that Somalia was
viewed as such a crisis reveals the powerful impact of U.S. public opinion. The American
public, perhaps not aware of the possibility of risk to soldiers in what they viewed as a poor,
famine-stricken African nation, were outraged at the sight of such violent anti�American
sentiment. The Clinton administration's fearful perspective was an outgrowth of the negative
public reaction. Although there most likely would liave been negative repercussions without the
public reaction (such as the international community's surprise at the embarrassment of
American troops), public outcry was the primary reason the Somalia intervention was viewed as
such a disaster. The public showed a very low tolerance for risk, which manifested itself in the
government's belief that humanitarian efforts were not worth the potential gain: "Somalia and
other recent embarrassment in Haiti indicated that multilateral initiatives for humanitarian
64 Barnett, 37.
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purposes would likely bring the United States all loss and no gain."65 Notice how the cost
benefit analysis is applied here. The lives of Somalis hardly count as a "gain." McCormick
refutes the language of failure in reference to Somalia, estimating that President Bush's decision
to intervene saved the lives 500,000 Somalis. 66
Clinton and his advisers realized that another humanitarian failure would have negative
consequences for his approval ratings. Therefore, the almost complete absence of citizens
advocating for intervention in Rwanda combined with the possibility that intervention may have
negative repercussions on Clinton's political capital tilted the cost-benefit analysis to strongly
oppose intervention. The following descriptions of the chain of events is telling: "The
international fiasco in Somalia and the deaths of more than fifty professional soldiers so shocked
the American people that the Clinton administration had to rethink its foreign politics [emphasis
added]."67 As this statement suggests, the repercussions of this outcry were visible in the manner
the administration reacted to Rwanda. This supports the claim that public opinion can shape the
policies of the administration. While the Clinton administration certainly had the power to mold
public opinion as well as to agree or disagree with it, the point here is that the administration's
actions were heavily influenced by public opinion. Boutros-Gali's account speaks of a "direct
connection" between Somalia and U.S. policy toward peacekeeping and then links it to Rwanda
and the U.S. 's refusal to intervene. 68 The repercussions of Somalia on the Clinton
administration's handling of the Rwanda genocide are seen in two ways; first, it conttibuted to its
categorization of the killings as tribal warfare; second, it fostered an intense fear of"1isky"
peacekeeping operations.
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Government officials and journalists alike seemed to interpret Rwanda in terms of the
recent events in Somalia. Des Forges explains, "If Washington officials described the killings as
'chaos,' it was because they saw Rwanda through the prism of Somalia. In this light, Rwanda
was another 'failed state,' just one in a series of political disasters on the continent."69 She also
provides examples ofjournalists using rhetoric that fit within this over simplistic perspective. 70
It can be inferred, therefore, that the American people reading the papers and listening to the
news also fell prey to this false analogy. Other accounts of the reaction of the United States
reveal that while the aftermath of Somalia may have contributed to the international
community's failure in Rwanda, it is neither the only reason nor is it reason enough to dismiss
the failure on the grounds of insufficient knowledge or information. As the American public, our
moral obligation to intervene in cases of genocide implies a certain level of effort on our pa1i. In
this case, sufficient infom1ation about and knowledge of the situation was available to those
individuals who fulfilled this duty.
In addition to contributing to an inaccurate perception of Rwanda, the post-Somalia
political fallout fostered a fear among the Clinton administration (as well as the U.N.) of future
Somalias. Des Forges, Barnett, and Holly Burkhalter each label Somalia as a ghost. This seerus a
fitting description. The Clinton administration operated with the distinct fear that the disaster
would be repeated. Gourevitch elaborates, "After Somalia, it's really clear that the Clinton
administration was terrified of body bags."71 Scholars argue that this fear limited the
administration's vision of what was possible, "For much of April, a Clinton administration that
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·
, of,mtervention.
saw Somalia lurking around every comer never even deb ate d the merits
Barnett explains that the United States may have been only willing to express this fear
privately. 73 Although perhaps politically prudent, the acknowledgment that foreign policy was
dictated by fear of future failures would have seemed selfish, especially in light of the nature of
the problems in Rwanda. The United States government did not want to be seen as placing such
a high priority on the lives of American soldiers that it had to avoid all possibilities of risk, even
in the face of genocide.
As this explanation reveals, the events in Somalia had such a formative role in shaping
the response of the Clinton administration that possible solutions were ruled out before they were
even fully considered. The perspective of the administration can be largely credited to the public
outcry following Mogadishu. If there had not been such a negative reaction among Americans,
members of the Clinton administration would most likely not have had such an intense fear of
another Somalia. This connection reveals that the public plays an important, but not necessarily
positive, role in the executive branch's attitude toward foreign policy. Public opinion in itself is
not enough: it must be both informed of international news and aware of moral obligations, a
topic I return to in later chapters.

Congressional Pressure

The dominant beliefs of Congress during the Clinton administration also played a key

role in shaping the administration's perspective. As explained in Chapter One, Clinton was
trying to balance the opinions of the anti-U.N. Congress with his desire to support U.N. efforts.
A January 1994 editorial by Senate minority leader Bob Dole represents the perspective of
7 2 Barnett,
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members of Congress opposed to increased U.S. involvement in the United Nations. He writes,
"It is not in America's interests to let the U.N. define our foreign policy ... when the U.N.
4

Security Council votes, American taxpayers should grab their wallets." 7 Dole introduced his
proposed "Peace Powe rs Act," which aimed to limit the power of the United Nations through
various restrictions. Dole hoped to include Congress in U.N. decisions: "The act should insure
that U.S. foreign policy interests, American soldiers and American taxpayers are better
protected." Dole's focus on convincing Americans that their best interests involved less suppo1i
for intervention reflects the power of public opinion, as well as the type of opposition that
Clinton faced.
Barnett labels Clinton's balancing strategy "tough love," arguing that at the time both the
media and the American public agreed with his reasoning. 75 In fact, Barnett even argues that the
Clinton administration deliberately supported positions opposed to intervention in the hopes that
putting this "tough love" strategy into action would benefit the administration by increasing
domestic support for his foreign policy. He points to the specific instance of the U.S. opposition
to both the renewal and the expansion of the UNAMIR mandate, "Now Clinton officials
marching up to Capitol Hill would be able to point to a concrete instance of their ability to say no
to peacekeeping when certain conditions had not been met ... Washington had no strategic
interests at stake or any powerful domestic constituencies to fear. It could safely make an
example of Rwanda."76 Melvern makes a similar argument, "The Clinton administration was
determined to demonstrate a tough policy to an anti-U.N. Congress to show that the U.N. could
be selective. 77 One does not necessarily need to accept the strong argument that the
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administration (and Congress) purposefully sacrificed Rwanda for their political gain. The
weaker version points to the larger argument important to the present examination of the
domestic perspective: action was perceived by the administration as risky while inaction was not
because it did not see any tangible losses at stake.
The executive branch looks to the legislative branch to voice the concerns of the people.
In this case, Congress gave Rwanda relatively little attention, which made it easier for the
administration to avoid taking action. However, if more Congressmen had demanded action,
they could have motivated the administration to act rather than resist intervention. Power
contrasts the response of the White House to the demands of the U.S. Congress in regards to
their policy of sending back Haitian refugees with the massacres in Rwanda that were occurring
at the same time. Power follows this criticism with a quotation from representative Alcee
Hastings (D-FL) that reflects the reality of domestic politics: "In my constituency, I'm first to
admit that the primary focus is on Haiti ... A:fiica seems so far away, and there is no vital
interest that my constituency sees. "78 This example brings the relationship between public
support and governmental leadership into play. In order for elected officials to risk political
capital advocating for citizens of other countries, there must be some support coming from the
constituents. Without constituent support, legislators are inclined to focus their energies
elsewlwre, thus placing the burden ofresponsibility solely on the executive branch.
Congressional opinion is a reflection, with one or more degrees of separation, of public
opinion. While this linkage is not as direct as the connection between public outcry and the
administration's response after Somalia, it is nonetheless present and relevant to my argument
that public opinion played an influential role in U.S. policy decisions during Rwanda.
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Although I have separated the impact of the Somalia case and dominant Congressional
opinions for the purpose of this discussion, they are closely connected. Even before October
1993, Republicans in Congress had been critical of Clinton's foreign policy. Barnett explains
that Clinton became an easy target among Republicans who believed that the United Nations
relied too heavily on U.S. financial support and had too much power over American soldiers. 79
The embarrassment of U.S. soldiers in Somalia fed the criticism that many individuals in
Congress had already begun. Thus, it was the combination of Somalia and anti-UN. sentiment
in Congress that caused the administration to view future humanitarian efforts with caution and
even fear. As a result, the Clinton administration had a narrow vision of possible actions it could
take in Rwanda.

Hearing Silence

Fear of domestic political backlash was only part of the reason for the decisions that the
administration made, however. Numerous accounts of the role of the United States in Rwanda
cite the absence of American demands for action as a main reason for the eventual decision on
the part of the administration not to intervene. The reasons for and role of silence deserves more
explanation if the U.S.'s failure to intervene is to be prevented in the future. Although less
tangible and admittedly harder to prove, the silence of the American public actually pe1mitted
inaction to be seen as a politically safe move. In as much as is possible, I will show that the
members of the Clinton administration "heard" silence, and then explain the impact of this
silence on their perspective.
Power emphasizes the silence of American citizens, "All possible sources of pressure
U.S. allies, Congress, editorial boards, and the American people-were mute when it mattered
79
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for Rwanda." 80 She explains that opponents of intervention made more noise than did
supporters: "There were few letters or phone calls to the U.S. Mission or to the UN. or to the
White House to urge that something be done, and these few signs of compassion were
overwhelmed by the sheer number that urged the administration to resist the intervention
temptation." 81 Burkhalter claims that the combination of general opposition toward
peacekeeping and the lack of a domestic constituency advocating for intervention led to
Clinton's policy of inaction during the genocide.82 The connection she draws between the
aftermath of Somalia and the silence· of American citizens in determining the approach of the
Clinton administration during the genocide is supported by many accounts of U.S. policy
decisions.
The absence of expressed support for intervention influenced the decisions of the Clinton
administration. In her history of the Rwandan genocide, Des Forges provides specific situations
that reveal the impact that the silence of American citizens had on the policy decisions of the
Clinton administration. 83 Clinton reportedly asked during a meeting concerning Rwanda if the
Congressional Black Caucus had expressed concern for the plight of the Rwandans. Although
this group is one step removed from public opinion, it certainly listens for public opinion and is
influenced by it, perhaps more directly than President Clinton. Clinton was informed that the
·caucus had not voiced concern. This example shows that Clinton's decision-making process
was affected by what the people thought should happen in Rwanda. Des Forges offers another
example that is particularly telling. A representative of the Human Rights Watch asked Anthony
Lake how they could have a more powerful role in influencing policy. Lake responded, "Make
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more noise."84 If public support for Rwandans were obvious, it seems that at the very least
officials would not be able to escape action in the manner that they did, by either ignoring or not
listening for more information about the nature of the crimes that were being committed. Power
makes this connection, "The American public expressed no interest in Rwanda, and the crisis
was treated as a cease-fire or as a 'peacekeeping problem' requiring a U.N. withdrawal. It was
not treated as a genocide demanding instant action."85
As a result of this silence, politicians were able to ignore the problem in Rwanda without
negative political repercussions. Scholars explain the Clinton administration's failure to act in
Rwanda as stemming at least in part from the sad reality that there were no votes to be gained
through action. Conversely, nor were there any votes to be lost by inaction. As shown by the
domestic outcry after Somalia, it seemed that humanitarian intervention was a politically risky
move. Silence was an incentive for inaction. Thus, public opinion seemed to dictate that the
administration ignore the genocide. As the decisions examined in the next section will show, the
administration neither explained the reality of the situation to the public nor sought input
regarding what courses of action the public would deem acceptable. Melvern explains, "There
was no moral ·outcry about the genocide and this made it easier for politicians to claim that the
hatred in Rwanda was impervious to military intervention and that public opinion was not
prepared to pay the price for casualties, And so, like the Jews, the Tutsis were abandoned to their
fate." 86 Des Forges makes a similar observation concerning the important relationship between
the tendencies of the administration and the continuance of these policies because of the absence
of public demand: "Those at the top had little incentive to go beyond the outcry from the
American people, a consideration of overwhelming importance for political leaders who at the
84 Quoted in Des Forges, 624.
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time focused more on domestic than on international issues."87 The argument that leaders took
advantage of the silence to continue on the path of least resistance will be expanded in Chapter
Three, in which I argue that it is for this reason that public opinion becomes even more impo1iant
and potentially constructive.
The administration's fear of a "risky" peacekeeping operation and the silence of
American citizens help explain why the Clinton administration approached the genocide with the
perspective that it did. These descriptions provide clues for instances when citizen voices would
have helped. The following analysis of decisions adds evidence to these assertions,
strengthening the argument outlined above.

Decisions
The influence of public opinion on the manner in which Clinton handled the Rwandan
genocide is revealed in several United States policy decisions that reflect a careful attempt to
avoid potential risk while not appearing to ignore completely the plight of the Rwandans. The
stances that most fully reveal the importance of American opinion are the Clinton
administration's refusal to label the crisis genocide and its use of the Presidential Decision
Directive 25.

Genocide?
The reluctance of United States' leaders to use the term genocide in desc1ibing the events
in Rwanda is one of the most frequently cited examples of their indifference to the trne situation
in Rwanda, as well as their attempt to avoid the legal and moral obligation to act. As a signatory
to the Genocide Convention, the United States was legally obliged to take action against the
87 Des Forges, 624.
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perpetrators in cases of genocide. In addition, the United States publicly vowed never to let the
horrors of the Holocaust be repeated. Historian Gerald Prunier links the desire to avoid another
"Somalia" to the Clinton's administration consistent shying from the tenn genocide. He
criticizes its attempt to explain away the Tutsis deaths as acts ofgenocide rather than genocide:
"If one goes by the State Department's surrealistic reasoning, no intervention should have been
made against the Nazi death camps since the Gennan authorities were at the time killing large
numbers of non-Jews."88 His criticism adheres to the argument that many scholars share: the
U.S. government's attempt to justify its inaction through the use of precise language that avoided
the word genocide until the very end of the crisis can be labeled as one of the most prominent
and easily recognizable failures to treat the genocide in the expected moral and legal manner.
Tony Marley, Political Military Advisor for the U.S. State Department during the genocide,
confirms that the administration knew the events in Rwanda were genocide. 89 James Woods,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the Department of Defense, gives a similar
description, claiming that the Pentagon knew it was genocide within ten to fourteen days after
the outbreak of killing.90 Woods expressed his disappointment in the administration's wavering
on the use of the term: "That was a very miserable day for me."91
The government officials' avoidance of the tem1 reveals their awareness of possible
repercussions and the importance of maintaining positive political favor. U.S. leaders were
hesitant to label the problem genocide for fear that, if they did, the American public (and

international community) would demand action. The administration's reluctance to admit
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genocide reveals a careful balancing of calculations of public opinion. On one hand, the fear of

public criticism drove leaders to try to avoid naming the Rwandan conflict genocide. However,
on the other hand, leaders knew that they could not continue to avoid the issue if the public
found out that the events should be labeled genocide and the leaders were in fact failing to
acknowledge the problem. Power explains, "[American officials] also believed, understandably,
that it would ham1 U.S. credibility to name the crime and then do nothing to stop it." 92
One particularly condemning example of concern over the appropriate language occurred
during an interagency teleconference. Susan Rice, a member of the National Security Council,
asked, "If we use the word genocide and are seen as doing nothing, what will be the effect on the
November [congressional] election?" 93 Power comments on this statement, using testimonies
from Rice's fellow staff members to show that even though co-workers were surprised to hear
this comment spoken aloud, it was not far removed from the silent thoughts of those same
individuals. 94 This instance reveals the normally unspoken role of domestic interests in the
Clinton administration's handling of the international crisis. In addition, the evidence of the two
way relationship between elected leaders and their constituents opens up opportunities for
possible solutions. Careful observers would have known that genocide was occurring in
Rwanda, regardless of whether the administration labeled it as such. Americans could have used
this knowledge to question why the administration was avoiding the tenn genocide. If the

American public had already been demanding action on the part of the US government, perhaps
Rice would have made a similar comment about the upcoming election that would have
encouraged action instead of careful avoidance of the problem.
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Similar calculations are evident in the proceedings during a United Nations meeting on
April 30, 1994. The Security Council was debating whether or not the word genocide should be
used. The Council President Colin Keating wanted a statement before his term ended that very
night, and so threatened to open the meeting to the public, a move that would allow the general
public to learn of the positions of the respective governments. Des Forges i nterprets, ''Those
most opposed to a strong statement did not want that and so were obliged to agree on a statement
that included the wording of the Genocide Convention, although it did not use the word
genocide."95 This sequence of events illustrates the careful positioning of the members of the
Security Council. Wheeler gives credit to the media and the resultant pressure, "The Security
Council's Presidential Statement of April 30 reflected its response to the growing intemational
demand from domestic publics and humanitarian NGO's for action to stop t he killings. Media
coverage finally galvanized the U.N. into action."96 This statement appropriately portrays press
coverage as the medium by which the various actors were informed and took steps to argue that
the United Nations should take action. Wheeler's placement of partial agency on the public
opinion of the respective nations again emphasizes the power of public opinion to shape policy
decisions.
A similar example is the assertion that the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher
refused to label the killings genocide until pressure from both Congress and the media left him
with no other choice. Burkhalter' s account confinns this causation: "The administration
equivocated from May until mid-June, when congressional outrage and a rash of critical articles
in the press forced Secretary of State Warren Christopher to finally invoke the tenn."97 Des
Forges credits this change in policy to a New York Times story in early June that referenced a
95
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State Department directive that discouraged use· of the word. 98 The scales had finally tilted, and
public realization of administrative policy forced recognition of the proper name for the horrors
in Rwanda.
Each of the above examples position the fear of negative public opinion as the driving
force behind the U.S. 's decision to finally acknowledge that genocide had occurred in Rwanda.
While actors such as the members of the Security Council and the U.S. Secretary of State at first
avoided the term because if its legal and moral implications, they knew that at a certain point
they had to use it or the public would be outraged by their careful avoidance. They understand
their moral obligation to act, as did the public.

Presidential Decision Directive 2 5
Scholars argue that the United States slowed the peacekeeping process down in early
May through its attempt to apply the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), publicly
released on May 3, 1994. This statement, developed by Richard Clarke of the National Security
Council, listed criteria that should be taken into consideration during U.S. discussions
concerning the appropriate level of U.S. participation in foreign intervention. In order for troops
to engage in combat (the final stage on a continuum of intervention), the proposed course of
action had to further the interests of the U.S., be necessary for the operation's success, have an
"acceptable" degree of risk, have an exit strategy, and have domestic and congres�ional
support. 99 The list of criteria reflects the priority of public suppo1i, as congressional and public
support is a specific criterion.
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Wheeler is careful to point out that PDD-25 defines U.S. interests fairly broadly.
Rwanda could have fit under "a threat to or breach of international security" within either the
category "urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence" or "gross violation of human
rights coupled with violence." 100 He explains, "Consequently, the Clinton administration could
have defended forcible humanitarian intervention in Rwanda for the first two weeks in April on
the grounds that halting genocide was both a moral duty and in national interests." 101 According
to Wheeler's analysis, although the Clinton administration used PDD-25 to avoid intervention,

the actual wording of the document does not dictate this course.
PDD-25 reveals a shaping of U.S. policy around the perception that the American public
wanted a more restricted use of American troops abroad. The purpose of the document was to
provide a careful set of guidelines that would limit the possibility that the administration would
become involved in humanitarian efforts that would have negative repercussions similar to
Somalia. The reason for and ':ontent of the document shows a deliberate attempt on the paii of
the administration to cater to public demand. As such, PDD-25 shows the role of public opinion
in determining when and how the U.S. military should be deployed. Wheeler, Destexhe, and Des
Forges each establish a connection between the public outcry following Mogadishu to the
reasons for the crafting of PDD-25. 102 James Woods names PDD-25 as a direct result of the
effect of Somalia on peacekeeping. 103 These linkages show that the administration wanted to
avoid making the same "mistake" again, and so assembled a checklist of criteria with which to
assess whether intervention in a foreign country was necessary. Representative David Obey (D
WI) described the intention behind PDD-25: "Zero degree of involvement and zero degree of
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risk and zero degree of pain and confusion." 104 Boutros-Gali is also critical, noting the narrow
nature of U.S. interests: "The new rules were tightly drawn as to scope, mission, duration,
resources, and risk so that only the easiest, cheapest, and safest peacekeeping operations could be
approved under them." 105
The perception that peacekeeping was risky stemmed from the negative public response
after Somalia. This led to the establishment of PDD-25, which in tum had a measurable effect
on the inaction of the international community. Des Forges blames PDD-25 for the delay in the
U.N.'s response to Rwanda: "[The United Nations] discussion about the size, mandate, and
strategy for a new peacekeeping force continued until May 17, in part because of US rigidity in
applying its new standards for approval of peacekeeping operations." 106 De Waal and Omaar
also blame PDD-25 for delays in troops and money. 107 It can be deduced, then, that the
American public did cont1ibute to the failure of the international community dming Rwanda.

Possibilities
I emphasize the role of public opinion by contrasting the inaction of the United States
government during the genocide with the help it provided to the refugees during the summer
refugee crisis. I argue that the differences in the Clinton administration's outlook and resultant
policy decisions can be explained almost entirely by differences in public demand. This study
also hints at lessons for the future regarding the importance of access to accurate and timely
information and the dangers of depending on emotions dictated by television images.
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A Note on the Media
A crucial point to keep in mind throughout the following analysis is that the media derive
influence from the combination of the real and perceived power they have to sway public
opinion. Although they may seem at times to influence directly the decisions of the government,
this is only because the government believes that the people are or will be persuaded by the
media's line of argument. Thus, the media is important because public opinion is important. The
trnth of this statement is revealed by trying to reverse it-public opinion is impo1iant because the
media is important. This would not hold true, as media coverage is the means by which the
public becomes informed rather than the end goal in itself.
The relatively recent trend toward television news and real-time reporting has changed
the role of the media in affecting public opinion and policy decisions. Some scholars claim that
a process termed the "CNN effect" can explain peacekeeping efforts during the l 990' s. This
argument asse1is that television coverage of a crisis leads to public criticism of the government's
current policy, which in tum leads to pressure on the government and finally results in the
government taking action. 108 Peter Jakobsen studied three humanitarian interventions that are
frequently cited as evidence of the CNN effect (Iraq in 1991, Somalia in 1992, and Rwanda in
the suminer 1994) and arrives at a more qualified assessment of the CNN effect. He first limits
the CNN effect to being a useful framework only in cases "when Western governments oppose
military intervention in conflicts where massive human rights violations occur." 109 He then
claims that while the CNN effect was not the cause of the respective interventions, it did play a
necessary role in bringing about a change in policy in each case. 110 Because it appropriately
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gives the media agency but stops short of assi gning it complete power to change policy,
Jakobsen's argument sheq.s light on the calculations behind the policy decisions of foreign
governments.
In addition, while many analysts have debated the CNN effect and rightly pointed out the
impact of television, it is by no means the only important fo1m of media coverage. This is
particularly true in the case of Rwanda, as television stories with pictures were rather limited
during the actual genocide. The ramifications of this fact will be shown in the explanation of
media coverage during the refugee crisis.

Comparison to the Refugee Crisis

The differences in the media's portrayal of the genocide and the refugee crisis and the
resultant differences in U.S. policy decisions supports the argument that American public
opinion played a determining role in the United States' treatment of Rwanda. RPF forces took
over Rwanda's capital, Kigali, on July 4, 1994. Although refugees were first mentioned in the
news in the beginning of May, the true exodus of Rwandans began on July 14. It is estimated
that one million people fled to Zaire within a time span of two days. 111 Melvern cites statistics
showing a total of two million people left Rwanda, leading to the sad conclusion, "Sixty percent
of Rwanda's population was now either dead or displaced." 112 Prunier provides similar
numbers. He places the percentage of displaced Rwandans at fifty percent of the total
population. 113
Public opinion is important, but that is not to say it is not subject to mistakes. The
delayed response to the problems in Rwanda is an example of one such mistake. I am not
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criticizing American efforts in helping the refugees, as the country was in desperate need of
assistance. The key issue is the comparison of the quick response to the refugee crisis to the
prolonged inaction during the genocide.
Melvem's analysis of the international response to the refugee crisis is appropriately
cynical. It is difficult to accept the sad trnth that, on the one hand, the Tutsis went ignored
during the months of genocide, while on the other hand, those who perpetrated the crimes and
fled the country following the RPF's victory were helped quickly and efficiently. Admittedly,
many Tutsi and moderate Hutu victims as well as innocent Hutus were among those who fled. It
seems ironic, though, that the difference in response was so great, particularly in light of the
important details of the slaughters-the perpetrators were helped while innocents had been
i gnored up until this point. Melvem writes, "Amid an uproar of public outrage at the agony in
these camps, the American administration decided on a major response costing $300 - 400
million, with up to 4,000 military to reinforce hundreds of US civilians, mostly independent,
relief workers, together with a massive airlift." 114 She notes that it took only three days from the
time the orders were issued for the military to be in Rwanda. In exasperation, she ends with a
criticism of the international reaction, ''Dallaire believes that in the case of the refugee camps in
Goma, precious resources were wasted in fuelling a charade of political conscience-cleansing by
the developed states in deference to the media and their con_stituents." 115 Melvern uses strong
language to frame her argument, calling the refugees "the largest group of fugitive murderers
· 's assessment 1s
· even more cond
ever assembled . "116 prumer
.
as he asserts that the exodus
emnmg,
was planned and carried out by the same persons that were responsible for the genocide. 117
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Keeping these realities in mind, the present analysis now turns to an explanation of why the
international community responded so quickly and generously to the Rwandan refugees, many of
whom had taken part in the genocide.
Media coverage of Rwanda peaked not during the spring massacres that killed upwards
of 800,000 people, but rather during the refugee crisis that followed the genocide. 118 Strobel
tracked evening television news footage of Rwanda from April to August and repo1ied that the
amount of news stories numbered forty-three in April, forty-three in May, twenty-seven in June,
sixtyjive in July, and thirty-eight in August [emphasis added].119 He calls the power of
television images "shallow and limited ... the images from Rwanda have no impact on United
States policy until their content changes in July, when hundreds of thousands of helpless
refugees fled from for the country's borders." 120 He believes that television coverage of ethnic
warfare was not sufficient to motivate public action. In reference to the inaction during the
genocide and the aid provided during the refuge crisis, Strobel asse1is, "Policymakers probably
read the public mood correctly." 121 In short, the public was not concerned with helping the
Rwandans during the genocide but was motivated to provide assistance during the resultant
refugee crisis. Tony Marley, a State Department official during the genocide, believes that
Americans reacted so quickly to the refugee crisis because of the CNN factor: "Once CNN and
other media began portraying this disaster in Goma and the public started leaning on Congress,
the U.S. government was forced to act." 122 This statement shows that although the media are the
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means by which the government is pressured, it is public opinion that drives this pressure and
creates change.
This difference in the world's response to the two situations is a sad testament for the
need for increased compassion and sense of duty among the publics of the countries with the
power and resources to act in situations such as genocide. Placing the victims of crises into
broad categories is problematic, as it often neglects to consider the uniqueness of the situation.
This labeling then affects how the American public responds to the problem. Pmnier compares
the extent of television coverage dming the spring and summer and concludes that the increased
availability of television images during the refugee crisis affected "the relative perception of the
two events." 123 Although his explanation is not as incriminating as Strobel 's, it again raises an
important question-do Western publics such as the United States rely too heavily on visual
images? It seems that the lack of television images during the genocide inhibited the potential
for public demand that would spur governmental action. Dallaire reports that journalists were in
Rwanda, as he purposefully helped them in an effort to inform the world of the genocide.
Dallaire believes that it was a lack of interest in Rwanda rather than a lack of information that
most contributed to the inadequate coverage: "And so the media was getting the story. The stuff
was coming out. It wasn't being published." 124 He cites a study of ABC, CBS, and NBC news
coverage during the genocide which revealed that the Tonya Harding story received more
coverage than Rwanda. 125 This evidence supports the claim that proximity and ability to identify
with the victim affect both what is aired as well as the observer's reaction to it.
Strobel argues that it was the public outcry from the television coverage of the Rwandan
refugees that made the difference in the administration's quick response. He cites a U.S. Defense
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Departlnent official, who spoke in reference to the refugee crisis, "The public awareness of what
was going on clearly motivated the U.S .... It seemed impossible to stand back and not do
anything."

126

Shawn McCormick also links the differences in media coverage with the United

State's quick decision to offer aid to Rwanda, "It was at that stage the Clinton administration,
reacting to the intense media coverage of the human catastrophe, decided it was in the national
security interest of the United States to help end the suffering of the Rwandan people." 127 His
use of the term "national security interest" points out the contradiction between U.S. inaction
during genocide and U.S. action during the refugee crisis. Neither problem fell within the
immediate national security interests of the United States. The administration used this type of
language to justify the disparities between its approaches to the respective problems. The greater
extent of media coverage, coupled with increased public attention, were two important variables
in the Clinton administration's decision to help the Rwandan refugees.
The importance of the media cannot be overestimated. However, the reason for its
importance is its effect on the American public. It is both a stimulus and a gauge of public
opinion. The widespread belief that United States leaders intervened during the refugee crisis
because of public demand and television coverage supports the main conclusion of this
chapter-calculations of American public opinion play a powerful role in the decisions of the
Clinton administration. The reaction to the refugee crisis shows what may have happened if the
American people had rnade more noise during the genocide in April and May.
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Conclusion
One scholar summarizes well the intent of this chapter in emphasizing the important role
of the American people, "Until Americans are informed and involved in demanding that their
governments become engaged more fully, earlier, and more vigorously ... the 'next Rwanda'
will likely be handled much the same. Judging from our government's inaction, you would never
know that a textbook case of genocide had been perpetrated in central Africa. This might also be
said judging from the silence of the American people." 128 Admittedly, public opinion is only one
of several components of an ideal solution. It is, however, a vital one that frequently goes
overlooked in the midst of criticism of the failure at the level of national governments and
international organizations. As the above analysis reveals, the voice of the American people
permeates the perspectives and decisions of the administration, even when that voice is
represented as silence. American citizens must realize and take advantage of their power to
create political will, thereby influencing the decisions of U.S. leaders. Rather than serving as an
impediment, the media can play a positive and influential role in this process as well.
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CHAPTER THREE
"SILLY HUMANITARIAN ISSUES"

How could the most powerful leaders in the world remain complacent while upwards of
800,000 innocent Rwandans were slaughtered by their fellow citizens? Destexhe believes that
the spirit of "optimistic determination" in which the United Nations was founded has faded and
"pragmatism" has taken over. 129 He names the world's inaction as a consequence of this change.
Upon reading about the genocide, I was initially hesitant to place blame on individual leaders
such as President Clinton. It is unfathomable that world leaders could have known about the
genocide, had the means necessary to stop it, and still neglected to act. Yet this is precisely what
occurred. My initia] reservations remain, however. I concede that individuals such as Clinton
and the members of his administration are to some extent blameworthy, but I also maintain that
the problem runs much deeper than the faults of individual leaders. To be sure, Rwanda is not
the first time genocide has been ignored by international powers. In her study of the role of the
United States during the genocides in Cambodia, Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, Power
writes, "One of the most important conclusions I have reached, therefore, is that the U.S. record
is not one of failure. It is one of success. Troubling though it is to acknowledge, U.S. officials
worked the system and it worked." 130 How exactly does this system function, and what can
American citizens do to improve it in the future? How have U.S. leaders repeatedly avoided
confronting g enocide, despite the U.S. 's status as a world leader and signatory to the Genocide
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Convention? My analysis takes the tendency of U.S. leaders to work within a nm.Tow
understanding of self and national interests into account and offers a solution that can help
overcome the problems created by this tendency.
The list of what the United States did not do is long. The U.S. government failed to heed
warning signs in the early spring of 1994, refused to classify the killings as genocide, withdrew
U.N. forces instead of sending additional support, and neglected to take intennediate actions,
such as providing armored personnel carriers for the Ghanaian U.N. forces or jamming the radio
lines used to spread anti-Tutsi propaganda. There are a multitude of possible explanations for
each of these decisions. Yet they all share a common characteristic: the prioritization of practical
concerns at the expense of principled considerations. By practical concerns I refer to the
logistical factors that influenced decisions, such as financial constraints, limited resources, and
the influence of public opinion. 131 Principled considerations refer to the normative realm-what
U.S. leaders should have done for moral reasons without regard to empirical concems. In
examining this phenomenon and studying the pressures that contributed to it, I hope to show that
the failures of individual leaders and the laws that govern the international community cannot
adequately explain the inaction of the United States. Because neither of these variables is fully
responsible for U.S. decisions, the best solution must lie at least partially outside these realms.
Replacing the individuals in power or reforming the laws will most likely help but will certainly
not ensure future success against genocide. Citizens and their failure to act or voice disapproval
played an important role as well. I use an analysis of the pressures on U.S. leaders to show why
American citizens may be the best agent for change.
If a solution does not rest entirely the leaders, where else can one be found? Was it the
international legal system that prevented the international community from responding? Quite
131
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the opposite, as the laws set in place by the Genocide Convention helped the case of advocates
for intervention and posed a barrier to opponents. As a signatory to the Genocide Convention,
the United States had a legal obligation to act in cases of genocide. The U.S. refusal to label the
killings genocide seemed an attempt to avoid being legally bound to act. Boutros-Gali claims,
"Albright and everyone else knew perfectly well that the mission was to stop the genocide then
in progress. Although it was a clear case of genocide, U.S. spokesmen were obviously under
instructions to avoid the term in order to avoid having to fulfill their treaty obligations under the
1949 Genocide Convention." 132 He blames Albright for "just following orders." 133 By this, he
refers to the orders of the administration, which dictated a different course of action than would
the "orders" of the Convention. The very standards put in place to ensure that genocide did not
go ignored in the future failed to work as they were intended. This demonstrates the value of
political will. Without the motivation to uphold these standards, leaders were able to avoid their
duties to Rwanda specifically and to humanity generally.
I will begin by explaining what exactly I mean by the gap between practical concerns and
principled considerations. I then examine the factors that contributed to this gap, arguing that the
dual pressures of the priorities of U.S. leaders and the nature of the bureaucratic process by
which decisions were made led politicians to commit ethical failures. For example, bureaucracy
tends to create an impersonal atmosphere and to allow individuals to hide or escape
responsibility for the decisions they make. After studying these two pressures in the broad
context of the genocide, I tum to specific examples that further demonstrate the seeming
callousness of U.S. leaders. The armored personnel carrier (APC) incident and the refusal to jam
radio broadcasts exemplify the misguided choices made by U.S. officials. I will use these
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examples to support my primary claim: an increased effort on the part of the citizens is the most
promising solution to prevent genocide in the future. Finally, I will describe this solution on a
broader level, explaining why it circumvents many of the barriers faced by politicians when we
depend entirely on them to guide U.S. decisions. In doing so, my aim is not to assign or erase
blame, but instead to map out how and why the United States failed so that the conclusion can
serve as a set of lessons for the future.

Practical Concerns versus Principled Considerations
As addressed in the previous chapter, United States leaders were acutely aware of the
risks that intervention might entail. Decision-makers were so attuned to seemingly rational
calculations that they lost sight of the impmiant moral issues at stake. Today, their actions are
widely considered unethical. I will begin this section with testimonies of several individuals in
positions of leadership at the time. These statements help illuminate the dichotomy that
developed between the practical and the principled forms of action. Analyses of the decisions
made before, during, and immediately following the genocide reveal that it was the practical
course of action that won. In addition, as several scholars point out, not only did the practical
course of action become the line of action the U.S. administration took, but it also was twisted in
:,,a manner that made it seem principled at the time. Identifying the source of the ethical failure is
the primary goal of this section. A secondary goal of this section is to question the assumption
that changing the individual leaders in power or international laws would prevent this gap from
occurring in the future.
Barnett's describes, "States allowed an almighty realpolitik to smother their faint
humanitarianism-a depressingly familiar story that reinforces the time-worn view that cold-
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hearted strategic calculations always trump noble ideals." 134 Two possible explanations arise:
either political leaders did not internalize the relevant moral considerations that accompanied
their decisions, or they were aware of the implications but nonetheless chose to place them at a
lower priority than practical considerations. Some combination of both phenomena is perhaps
the most accurate description. Yet, this does not explain exactly why the breakdown occurred.
Why did practical considerations dictate decisions? More importantly, what dynamic existed
that allowed practical considerations to appear principled?
Power points to this occurrence, "It is striking that most officials involved in shaping
U.S. policy were able to define the decision not to stop genocide as ethical and moral." 135 Not
only could officials defend their actions as adhering to practical constraints, but these practical
considerations also played such an overwhelming role that they seemed ethically justified.
Power explains that this is evidenced in several ways: first, officials exaggerated the risks of
intervention; second, they cited a purpo1ied goal of refraining from action in order to preserve
the future of peacekeeping; third, they wasted time; fourth, "The almost willful delusion that
what was happening in Rwanda did not amount to genocide created a nurturing ethical
framework for inaction." 136 Power's analysis underlines the role of volitional forces in the
decision-making process. While these mistakes could be labeled as partially cognitive, the
volitional aspect played a crucial role in inhibiting judgment. It was the volitional aspect that led
to the cognitive mistake as well. In this case, the reluctance of leaders to commit the resources
that would enable intervention contributed to their belief that their decisions were ethically
justified. If this explanation is accurate, there was more than a breakdown between empirical
and nonnative concerns; the empirical and normative were actually reversed in an attempt to
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justify U.S. policy decisions. In other words, the failures were a combination of volitional and
cognitive mistakes: the interests of the leaders prevented them from comprehending the relevant
moral issues. This possibility strengthens my claim that the ethical failure resulted from the
neglect of legitimate moral considerations.
But was it the fault of individual leaders? Many critics of U.S. policy decisions place
both blame and future agency on the most prominent leaders. One frustrated U.S. official
recorded his thoughts in his journal, "We have a foreign policy based on our amoral economic
interests nm by amateurs who want to stand for something-hence the agony-but ultimately
don't want to exercise leadership that has a cost." 137 Wheeler's analysis concurs with this
assessment. He admits that President Clinton "would have encountered resistance at home from
Congress a11d public opinion, but the President surely has a moral responsibility to lead public
opinion and enlarge their moral imagination." 138 Wheeler assumes that President Clinton has
sufficient moral imagination to enlarge that of others. This could be a faulty assumption
perhaps citizens have the moral imagination and the agency to enlarge the vision of their leaders
rather than the other way around.
The cost of action, from the perspective of the leader, may have been too great. Political
leaders are, by nature of their position, somewhat bound to the concerns of their constituents.
Ideally, President Clinton should have exercised principled leadership by responding to the
genocide quickly, with a willingness to devote both U.S. troops and other resources to help
Rwandans. However, as explained in Chapter Two, the public was not demanding this action.
Silence on the part of the public leaves the leader with two options. He can choose the course of
action that he believes the public will support or the course of action that the public would most
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likely disapprove (even ifhe believes it is the morally1ight course). During the genocide,
enough evidence existed to lead Clinton to believe the public was opposed to intervention.
Should he have been expected to lead morally a�d take action regardless? Placing the burden of
responsibility on our elected leaders to gauge public opinion and chose a course of action does
not include a sufficient amount of public voice. As the attempts to prevent a repeat of the
Holocaust have shown, it may be that leaders alone cannot be relied on to solve the problems. I
hope to show why we may want to place more hope in the agency of the people.

The Role of United States 'Leaders Priorities on Policy Decisions
When faced with a foreign crisis, U.S. national leaders, from the President to
Congressmen, inevitably have a very different set of priorities than does the typical American
citizen. National leaders have a greater role responsibility and personal investment in such
decisions. President Clinton is my primary example throughout this analysis, as his role can be
examined in the most direct manner. The President answers to American citizens as voters in the
Electoral College and Clinton was still in his first term at the time of the genocide, which means
his personal investment was particularly high. His decisions could influence his re-election
chances. A leadeI's role responsibility and personal investment in the decision•making process
are often dependent on each other. National interests of the country and the self-interests of the
President will often align closely but do not always mesh. Narrowly defined, neither includes
the well-being of the citizens of a distant African nation. The silence of American citizens, as
explained in the preceding chapter, permitted President Clinton and U.S. government officials to
safely assume that they would be seen as meeting the perceived priorities of American citizens
and their own interests without giving much consideration to the genocide in Rwanda. This
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section will examine the outcome of the two main sources of concern for politicians: their
responsibility to make policy decisions in the best interests of their constituents and their
personal investment in their success as individual politicians. Both concerns affect their
decision-making, which, in the case of Rwanda, led to misguided goals and ethical failures.
The President of the United States is committed to actions that further the perceived
national interests of the country. This creates a specific set of priorities and constraints.
President Clinton's administration worked within a nanow understanding of U.S. national
interests, however, when making decisions concerning Rwanda. While similar problems in a
more powerful or more threatening nation would be considered matters of national concern,
Rwanda's problems were not. The President and others saw explicitly humanitarian causes as
located outside U.S. national interests. When faced with risk (such as a repetition of the "Black
Hawk" incident in Somalia or criticism from Congress), the administration's preference was to
avoid involvement. James Woods was told by a superior at the Defense Department's African
Affairs Bureau, "Look, if something happens in Rwanda-Burundi, we don't care. Take it off the
list. U.S. national interest is not involved and we can't put all these silly humanitarian issues on
lists ... Just make it go away." 139 This blunt directive reveals the manner in which national
priorities dictated action that favored pragmatism over "silly humanitarian issues." Working for
national interests can be a principled act, but not to the extent to which this was carried during
the genocide. Genocide anywhere, regardless of the country's relationship to the United States,
should not be considered a "silly humanitarian issue." 140 The p aradigm of national interests
influenced the way in which officials responded to information about the conflict in Rwanda.
Power explains, "'Ethnic bloodshed' in Africa was thought to be regrettable but not particularly
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unusual. U.S. officials spoke analytically of 'national interests' or even 'humanitarian
consequences' without appearing gripped by the human stakes." 141
Rwanda had the unfortunate position of falling outside U.S. national interests and being
viewed as a concern that was in opposition to the interests of Anie1ican citizens. Leaders
believed that helping Rwandans would work against the immediate needs of their constituents.
As Wheeler observes, "The appalling failure of Western states to end the killings in Rwanda
demonstrates that, even in the case where there is good reason to think that the use of force
would have been successful with only limited casualties, state leaders resolved the agonizing
moral conflict between their duties to strangers and citizens in favor of the latter." 142 He
describes the two tensions as opposing forces: answering one duty would not work against the
other. This assumes an incompatibility of interests, however. Citizens feeling they have a duty to
help and voicing this belief could have shifted the problem in favor of intervention, thereby
reducing or even completely eliminating the "agonizing moral conflict" that Wheeler describes.
The personal investment of political leaders in policy decisions arises from the desire to
maintain or strengthen political capital as well as the wish to further the success of the institute
or organization. Little political capital could be gained, it seemed, from intervention in Rwanda;
in fact, if Somalia taught the administration anything, it was that acting to save Africans could
lose, not gain, political capital. Barnett explains, "Therefore, while in principle the United States
favored the Rwandan operation, in practice it objected to any proposal that might give Congress
yet another opportunity to scrutinize Clinton's foreign policy." 143 Although maintaining a
positive public image for the purposes of re-election is perhaps the most obvious reason why
politicians have a high personal investment, it is by no means the only factor. In Clinton's case,
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other considerations included strengthening his relationship with Congress and responding to
those questioning his foreign policy skills so that he could achieve his other goals. A similar
analysis could be made of members of Congress and even appointed staff members such as UN.
Ambassador Madeline Albright and Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The disconnect
between the self-interests of the leaders and the interests of Rwandans led to an ethical failure on
the part of the leaders. Note the significant overlap between role responsibility to work within
national interests and the personal investment at stake. In the case of Rwanda, both contiibuted
to policies of inaction during the genocide. If, through citizen commitment, the self-interests of
leaders and interests of Rwandans are more aligned, there is a greater chance the leader will offer
assistance to the Rwandans.
A common criticism of President Clinton's treatment of Rwanda is that he should have
exercised moral leadership. Such leadership in this case would have entailed disregarding narrow
self-interests to gain public favor and perhaps even the responsibility to make decisions that are
of immediately benefit to Ame1ican citizens. Critics believe that presidential leadership
demands the commitment to look beyond narrow interests and act in cases where greater
principles are at stake. My analysis reflects somewhat more sympathy for President Clinton and
those working for the U.S. government. After mapping out the situational forces that play a role
in policy decisions, it seems no wonder that the Clinton administration remained silent on the
matter. As explained above, working within the interests of the administration was seen as the
only available choice. Priorities were distorted by the limited perspective of leaders bound by
the interests of followers and personal investment in the decisions. This pressure led to
decisions that favored pragmatic actions over principled concerns (or failed to uphold the most
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important principles), and left diplomats wondering how they had a1Tived at the result that they
did.

The Role of the Bureaucratic Process on Policy Decisions
The priorities of the leaders in the Clinton administration became further distorted during
the decision-making process. Decisions that at the time were considered rational appear, in
hindsight, to have been irrational and unethical. The drawbacks of the bureaucratic process
become apparent, particularly in the context of similar situations in history. As pointed out in the
statements above, Clinton, Albright, and other policy makers became entangled in a we� of day
to-day decisions and lost sight of important, overarching ethical considerations.
Glover explains the forces that made the Holocaust possible, "'Sometimes the political
inadequacy seems to have come, not from anti-Semitism, but from the human response being
shriveled by bureaucracy." 144 Here, Glover places more emphasis on the process than on
motivational forces, in this case, anti-Semitism. Bystander behavior during the Holocaust
suggests how the practical considerations of bureaucracies can lead to a reduced importance of
ethical considerations. One of the many lessons the Holocaust offers is that this process can
have disastrous human consequences. In the case of Rwanda, it was not anti-Semitism but rather
a simple lack of concern for Rwandans.
Barnett's study of the role of the United Nations in Rwanda carefully explores how an
organization and its members are affected by the limits imposed by a bureaucratic stmcture and
its processes. Those working for the United Nations were dedicated to preventing genocide, but
they still failed to intervene while Tutsis were being slaughtered. Barnett explains the
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difficulties that arise when institutions such as the U.N. are entrusted, "We instinctively believe
that genocide and crimes against humanity trump all other moral claims and obligations ... But
before we accept this moral fundamentalism, we must recognize that the U.N., like all
institutions, assumes at any single moment a multitude of responsibilities and obligations." 145
This explanation characterizes the conflict that arises between the principled and the practical (or
between principles and other principles) and the problems that can arise when members of
institutions are the only individuals making important decisions. The limitations and
complexities of bureaucracy make these distinctions even more difficult to make. As Barnett
explains, bureaucracies provide a system for handling infonnation and also tend to shape how
decisions are made. He summarizes the effects of institutional pressure, "Well-meaning
individuals made regrettable choices, owing to a U.N. culture that restricted their field of vision
and a crisis environment that made it doubly difficult for them to imagine alternative ways of
seeing, knowing, and acting." 146 He cites the concerns of Max Weber and Hannah Arendt
regarding bureaucracies. Weber warned against allowing yomself to be dictated by rules, while
Arendt argued, "Bureaucratic institutions can dehumanize individuals." 147 This analysis points
to the inherent nature of bureaucracy that contributed to the failure of the United Nations to
intervene in Rwanda. Barnett concludes his book with a nuanced assignment of blame that takes
the forces of institutions into account but does not absolve individuals of responsibility.
Many of Barnett's points regarding the problem of institutional culture in the U.N. can be
e xtended to the United States and used to support of the claim that American citizens are in an
advantageous position to overcome these limitations. Bamett provides a wish for the future, "The
hope is that the institutionalization of ethics does not lead to individuals to substitute
145
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bureaucratically laced moralities for private moralities." 148 Foste1ing concern among American
citizens for citizens of other countries offers a way to achieve this goal. In order not to rely
completely on political leaders to resist the pressures of institutional culture, engaged and
concerned citizens could provide a system of checks and balances that our foreign policy seems
to need desperately.
The testimonies of Susan Rice and David Rawson, both of whom were intimately
involved with U.S. policy decisions during the genocide, point to a phenomenon of moral
gradualism. Poor decisions were made, one after another, but it was not until the final
cumulative effect of these decisions could be seen that their full impact was realized. The
phrase, "Death by a thousand cuts" is a fitting description of this process. Members of the
government such as Rice and Rawson now regret making these choices, and they provide
a1iiculate explanations that reveal they were unaware of the problem created by each concession
until it was too late. Rice, who worked for the peacekeeping department at the National Security
Council, explains, "There was such a huge disconnect between the logic of each decision we
took along the way during the genocide and the moral consequences of the decisions taken
collectively. I swore to myself that it I ever faced a similar crisis again, I would come down on
the sides of dramatic action, going down in flames if that was required." 149 Rawson, the U.S.
ambassador in Kigali, speaks of a similar realization, "One of the things I learned and should
have already known is that once you launch a process, it takes on its own momentum. I had said,
'Let's try this, and if that doesn't work, we can back away.' But bureaucracies don't allow that.
Once the Washington side buys into a process, it gets pursued, almost blindly." 150 These
statements point to the pressure that the very nature of the process exerts on the individuals
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making decisions. Personal and institutional investment in each decision build as the process
moves along, leading individuals to believe mistakenly that their set of choices is very limited.
They get locked into choices that they would not make if not facing these pressures. Rice and
Rawson express a commitment to act differently next time. These vows point to an inherent
flaw. Good decision-making should not depend on each individual resisting bureaucratic
pressures. Citizens are a step removed from the process, as they are not involved in every small
decision along the way. This degree of separation makes citizens less prone to the problem of
moral gradualism. Citizens can positively shape the system by working as an external source of
influence, thereby forcing the individuals within the bureaucracy to make decisions that will be
morally acceptable to those more removed from the decision-making process.

Pressures in Practice: The Influence of U.S. Priorities and Institutional Pressure
Two specific failures by the American leadership most clearly illustrate the flawed
decision-making process inherent in the political bureaucracy: first, the decision to refuse to
provide technical resources that would have enabled the jamming of radio lines inside Rwanda,
and later, the reluctance to provide armored pe�sonnel carriers (APCs) to Ghanaian soldiers in a
timely manner. Both seemed small decisions of practicality at the time, but each had large and
terrible consequences.

Radio Jamming
During the genocide, local radio was extremely important, as it was one of the main
sources of information. A major station, Radio-Television Libre Milles Collines (RTLM),
broadcast hate propaganda that directed Hutus to murder their Tutsi neighbors. Announcers
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would go so far as to air the exact location of hiding Tutsis, directing listeners to find and kill
them. Power explains that that United States could have taken action to stop the radio broadcasts
by destroying the antenna, playing counter-broadcasts that urged Rwandans to stop the genocide,
or jamming the radio lines. 151
Jamie Metzl provides a detailed and insightful analysis of the role of RTLM radio
broadcasts in the Rwandan genocide and the failure of international actors to prohibit these
broadcasts through the use of radio jamming technology. Metzl's assertion that U.S. and U.N.
officials had prior knowledge of the role of the radio in assisting the perpetrators of genocide is
confirmed by histo1ic accounts of the genocide as well as government records that show
discussion about whether or not the U.S. should jam the lines. General Dallaire estimated that a
timely jamming of the radio would have saved many lives. 152 The recent conviction ofRTLM
news media executives by an international court underlines the importance of the radio
broadcasts. The prosecutor in the international court explains, "The media was every bit as
important as the weapons of war." 153 A witness also highlighted the damage done by the radio,
"What RTLM did was almost to pour petrol, to spread petrol throughout the country little by
little, so that one day it would be able to set fire to the whole country." 154 While jamming the
radio would have involved monetary expenses as well as potential risk to the soldiers who would
be required to keep the lines restricted, it did not require the resources or the level of risk
involved in a full intervention. Rather, it is an example of a "middle ground" type of action that
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would have been effective but not overly demanding on the United States. In sho1i, it was the
least the U.S. could have done.
While Metzl focuses on how international law can be revised to better enable intervention
in the form ofradio jamming in the future, he acknowledges that logistical and political reasons
against involvement were the primary forces driving the United States' reluctance to intervene.
He cites governmental officials and human rights advocates as supporting this explanation. 155 In
fact, international law in this case was used as an excuse to shield the Western powers' actual
concerns. 156 It was by no means an insurmountable barrier had U.S. officials been determined to
halt the propaganda being spread by the radio in Rwanda. The United States could have jammed
the radio stations while remaining in compliance with international law, if they either classified
Rwanda as an enemy state (not recognizing the Hutu regime), or if the Security Council had
approved a Chapter VII response to a "threat to international peace and security". 157
The United States' refusal to use its radio jamming technology stands out as one of the
most prominent examples of the misguided judgments the U.S. officials made during the
genocide. Taking action would not have been overly demanding on U.S. resources. Melvern
argues that radio jamming was one of the least risky (because is was not overly expensive and
did not place many soldiers at risk) forms of action the United States could have taken. 158
Power's analysis illustrates the volitional role ofleaders' interests in the fonnation of the
government's priorities, "Pentagon planners understood that stopping the genocide required a
military solution. Neither they nor the White House wanted any part in a military solution. Yet
instead of undertaking other forms of intervention that might at least have saved some lives, they
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justified inaction by arguing that a military solution was required." 159 Burkhalter blames the
inaction on a lack of political will and the influence of the bureaucratic process: "It appears that
neither the State Department nor the NSC pursued [radio jamming] seriously, and that the
Pentagon discouraged serious inquiry by making is sound as if it were a technical impossibility.
In any event, the Clinton administration ...failed to take the one action that, in retrospect, might
have done the most to save Rwandan lives." 160 These accounts reveal the common pressures that
contribute to this particular ethical failure. First, it seems officials approached the decision
making process with the wrong goals in mind. Leaders were more concerned with maintaining a
pre-determined course of inaction than considering alternative methods of intervention such as
radio jaimning. At the very least, officials valued monetary costs and political 1isks at a much
higher priority than the halting of genocide. Second, small decisions (or acts of indecision) made
along the way added up as "a thousand cuts" to a horrific outcome. The cumulative effect of
each decision to avoid radio jamming, particularly when placed in the context of the U.S. refusal
to engage in other methods of intervention, resulted in an ethical failure that now haunts Rice,
Rawson, and most certainly dozens of others involved in the decision making.

The APC Incident
The failure of the United States to provide the annored personal carriers needed to
transport Ghanaian soldiers around Rwanda stands out as one of the most obvious examples of
logistical and political concerns taking priority over the needs of the suffering Rwandans. After
stalling on the part of the United States, the General Assembly finally approved UNAMIR II on
May 17. By that point, member states were well aware that the events in Rwanda constituted
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genocide; the Secretary-General had started describing it as such in mid-May. The member
states could no longer use ignorance of the true nature of the conflict as an excuse. Because of
the widespread killings and the devastation that had already occurred, the speed at which
UNAMIR II could be carried out was of utmost importance for the success of the mission.
Ghana provided 800 soldiers for the initial troops, but requested that they be provided with
armored personnel caITiers, a resource that Barnett terms a "military necessity." 161 On May 19,
the U.N. sent out a request for APCs. It was not until the last few days of May that the U.S.
responded by saying they had 50 APCs in Germany. Haggling between the U.S. and the U.N.
over whether the U.N. would lease or purchase the equipment, insurance policies, and the cost of
the transport wasted precious time. The APCs were in Uganda and fully equipped by late June,
but the U.N. did not have trucks large enough to transport them to Rwanda. In the end, the first
of the APCs only began aniving in Rwanda in early Aug11st, by which time more than 800,000
Rwandans had been killed. This logistical stall was one of the p1imary reasons that UNAMIR II
completely failed to carry out its mission.
Analysts cite the APC incident as one of the most poignant examples of the U.S. 's failure
to realize the immense human suffering allowed to continue by its insistence on following
procedure. Wheeler targets Western states in general and the United States specifically through
his assertion that providing the APCs was the least the U.S. could do, as it and the other Western
powers had failed to provide troops or sufficient funds. 162 Burkhalter calls this incident symbolic
of U.S. policy during the genocide. 163 She offers the testimony of a Defense Department official,
who admitted that a high-l�vel official with the resolve to speed the process along could have
successfully done so, but "at no time did any senior figure in the Clinton White House or State
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Department focus on the larger issue: the effect that foot-dragging and red tape were having on
the ability of the United Nations respond to the genocide." 164 Thus, the U.S.'s failure to provide
A.PCs in a timely manner reflects the distorted perspective of those individuals working in the

administration and insisting on working out details before taking action. 165 Barnett's account of
the APC incident arrives at a similar conclusion: "The image of Pentagon bureaucrats holding
endless meetings with their U.N. counterparts while the genocide was raging appeared
stunningly callous to nearly all. But the United States insisted that there were bureaucratic
procedures to follow ... " 166 Barnett argues the President Clinton was the single individual who
could have sped up the process. His placement of blame directly on President Clinton is helpful
to the present analysis, as it reflects the sad irony that while the President may be in the best
position to act outside of the rnles, he may be the least able to have the perspective that would
deem doing so a necessity. Power criticizes the Pentagon, claiming that Vice President Gore
committed the APCs and it was Pentagon officials that stalled their delivery. 167 While each

scholar divides the responsibility for the U.S. inaction slightly differently, each emphasizes the
absence of ethical considerations during arguments over details that are trivial in comparison to
the human cost.
The APC incident is a perfect example of the gap that appears when pragmatic concerns
take priority and decisions are made in a manner that is viewed later as devoid of ethical
principles. Officials lost sight of the most important goal at hand and were overly concerned
with insignificant bureaucratic procedures. Because citizens are not involved with bureaucratic
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processes such as securing the details for the APC's, they are better able to see and vocalize the
relevant moral dimension.
Barnett's conclusion seems fitting, as it points to a clear explanation for ethical failures,
"Why individuals use a different moral yardstick once they are inside an organization is a matter
of much empirical debate ... Perhaps Western culture has been governed by rules and legalities
to the point that rules and legalities become a substitute for private morality." 168 I hope to tum
next to a solution to this problem: citizens may be able to avoid the pressures that create "a
different moral yardstick" and therefore can help ensure that in the future U.S. leaders are
reminded of the most relevant ethical considerations. Practical concerns, which undoubtedly
play an important role, can take the form of challenges to be confronted rather than used as
excuses for inaction.
How can a bureaucracy designed to avoid risk be changed to respond to larger ethical
concerns? I believe that answer must come from outside the bureaucracy-in this case, from the
American citizens who elect our leadership.

The Advantages of Citizen Advocacy

Power points to my proposed solution in her statement, "In a democracy even a n
administration disinclined to act can be pressured into doing so. The pressure can come from the
outside or the inside." 169 Sadly, Rwanda is a case study in how even wellrintentioned individuals
(assuming we give them all the benefit of the doubt) inside the administration can fail to act.
The repeated failure of those on the inside calls for pressure from the outside.
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Citizens are in a better position to set principled goals for humanitarian interventions
because they are less influenced by motivational forces that favor a policy ofavoidance. They
are also able to avoid some of the cognitive mistakes associated with these tendencies.
Lieutenant General Wesley Clark supports this claim, "The Pentagon is always going to be the
last to want to intervene. It is up to the civilians to tell us they want to do something and we'll
figure out how to do it." 170 Hesitancy on the part ofleaders is a result of the pressures that stem
from role responsibility and bureaucracy. General Dallaire also emphasizes the importance of
setting principled goals, "An operation should begin with the objective and then consider how
best to achieve it with minimal risk. Instead, our objective began with an evaluation of risk and
if there was no risk, the objective was forgotten. You can't begin by asking if there is a risk. If
there is no risk, they could have sent the Boy Scouts, not soldiers." 171 Citizens typically have
less personal investment in the outcome and so have a higher tolerance for risk. Simply stated,
citizens have less to lose. In Rwanda, the Clinton's administration's fear ofloss was a powerful
force driving many of its decisions.
In addition, citizens who make the effort to educate themselves are in a better position
than political leaders to make an objective analysis of each policy decision as the process
unfolds. The example of the Holocaust helps explain this point. In his study of the Holocaust,
Glover argues that bystanders to genocide have a strong moral obligation to help, but he admits
that this action becomes more difficult when discussing specific ethical dilemmas faced by
leaders. He advises, "A code of ethics for officials should include having the imagination to look
through_the rules to human reality."172 This is the same argument made by critics of Clinton's
decisions. Could it be possible that officials in positions of formal leadership cannot fully "look
170
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through the rules" in the manner Glover advocates? The events in Rwanda demonstrate
members of bureaucracies can lose sight of important goals and become lost in day-to-day
decisions. As "outsiders" to the bureaucracy, citizens have an advantageous perspective.
Because they are less aware of the logistical details and pragmatic concerns attached to policy
decisions, they can question decisions that seem unethical, even in cases when the problems may
go unnoticed by leaders.
Let us briefly consider the hypothetical scenarios of the reactions of citizens in the case
of the radio jamming and APCs policy debates, so that we can better envision exactly how the
advantages of citizens would play out. An American aware of the genocide in Rwanda reads an
edit01ial that criticizes the U.S. government for failing to consider any intermediate steps short of
military intervention. The author of the editorial mentions radio jamming as an example of a
mode of intervention that did not involve troops. Because the reader does not have the all or
nothing perspective that dominated the Clinton administration, he questions why the government
has not considered this form of action. The use of radio to spread propaganda encouraging the
genocide stands out as particularly gruesome and worthy of being stopped through any possible
means. The reader can recognize the larger goal of lessening the killings and can then think
critically about U.S. policy decisions. In the case of the APC incident, an individual infom1ed of
the delay in delivery of these vehicles to Rwanda would almost certainly be shocked. He
probably would have the foresight to realize that haggling over prices and delivery is not an
acceptable excuse in the face of the many deaths that occurred for each day that the delivery was
stalled. The advantageous perspective of citizens does not guarantee that it will translate into
action on behalf of the victims of genocide. Recognizing the relevant ethical considerations is
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111e step in the right direction, however, and citizens have a unique capacity to make these
Lldgments without being overly influenced by other, less important factors.

� Vision for the Future
I acknowledge that the standards and actual behaviors of personal leadership and the
ystern of international law could stand to benefit from improvement. However, as the above
�alysis demonstrates, citizen advocacy is one level of change that can have a powerful impact.
itizens have an advantageous perspective that can help ensure that moral principles are not
:1shed aside or overridden by narrow national interests.
Taking this argument on step farther, citizen advocacy has the potential to do more than
st counteract the motivations that drive politicians. It can change the direction of these
otivations. Citizens voicing concern for Rwandans could have enabled politicians to see
tervention as both within national interests and favorable for their individual political capital.
1is would have provided motivation to counter forces that led to inaction.
Robert Johansen argues that "national interests" are often vaguely defined and interpreted
a misguided manner. He questions the common assumption that national interests are
.elusive of international interests. Citizens in today's world are affected by many variables that
: outside of the narrow interests of a particular nation-state. Johansen criticizes politicians for
erernphasizing short-tem1 interests such as public support at home and neglecting long-term
:erests of the nation in the process. 173 He calls on powerful political leaders to support these
=orts by changing their focus to reflect international p1iorities instead of narrow domestic
erests. His strategy, if carried out, would certainly improve the international community's
Robert Johansen, "Reconciling National and International Interests in UN Peacekeeping," in Ramesh Thakur and
·Jyle Thayer, A Crisis ofExpectations (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 285.
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response to crises. However, I believe the example of Rwanda proves that it would not be
enough. Political leaders are unlikely to change the system alone; the support and
encouragement of their constituencies are much needed. Johansen accurately explains the
seeming disparity between values and action, as defined in a narrow sense of humanitarian
intervention: "One might conclude that an articulation of global interests would say: 'Stop mass
starvation, war, and ethnic cleansing;' however, an articulation of national interests seems to say:
'Don't ask me or my fellow citizens to feed the hungry, disarm the violent, or stand between the
rapist and the victim. No, I can't pay any more to avert the continuation of such misdeeds. "' 174
My solution aligns public support in a ma1111er that places more value by the U.S. government on
the interests of citizens in countiies such as Rwanda, thereby avoiding or at least reducing the
dichotomy between values and action. Politicians would no longer have to make the choice
between the two forces, as acting in cases of genocide could help and would certainly not harm
their short-tem1 interests while building a stable global community.
The United States needs a method of setting and achieving goals that keeps relevant
principled concerns a top priority in cases of genocide. The U.S. could be more effective in
preventing genocide if the ultimate aim of the politicians was not of acting in the narrow self
interests of the people but, rather, responding to the demands of citizens who show concern for
members of other countries.
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CHAPTER FOUR
"NOBODY SHOULD FEEL HE HAS A CLEAR CONSCIENCE"

The existing literature on the role of the United States in Rwanda assumes moral
obligation but tends to not go into specifics. Assertions often take the form, "The United States
has a duty to intervene in cases of genocide." From where does this duty come? Why is the
United States the primary actor? Who, specifically, is implied by the term United States? Most
accounts fail to incorporate the question of the responsibility of American citizens and of human
beings. In addition, scholars are often much more focused on showing why intervention was
justified than assessing whether or not it was required. Genocide is a serious crime because it is
a violation of the most basic human right, the right to life. It is viewed as a threat not just to the
victims but to all of humanity. As such, the question of the moral obligation of American
citizens deserves further exploration. The goal of this chapter is to arrive at an answer to this
question, explaining and offering support for each of the above claims.
After opening with a summary of the legal obligations of the United States to genocide
victims, I will turn to the issue of the respective role-based responsibilities of the U.S.
government and individual American citizens. In reference to Rwanda, Kofi Annan remarked,
"Nobody should feel he has a clear conscience in this business. If the pictures of tens of
thousands of human bodies rotting and gnawed on by dogs ... do not wake us up out of our
apathy, I don't know what will." 175 Annan uses business to refer to the leaders of the
international community. I hope to challenge this placement of responsibility. At the very least,
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it should not be taken as an assumption that the responsibility to intervene in genocide is solely
that of national political leaders in the international community. Can American citizens fail to
act and maintain a clear conscience? An affirmative answer to this question could take one of
two fonns. The first would conclude that genocide victims do not fall within the responsibDity
of the international community. The second affimrntive response would conclude that some
actor within the inlemational community has an obligation to help but that it is not the duty of
American citizens to provide this assistance. I refote both affinnative answers and appeal to
social contract theory to show that the duties of the United States government are just a
recognition of the duties of American citizens. Finally, I tum to the plimary argument of the
chapter: American citizens have a moral obligation to help victims of genocide. Support for this
claim comes from both deontological and consequentalist philosophies.
The present chapter is primarily prescriptive in nature. The best approach to the study of
moral obligations, however, is one not limited to prescriptive arguments. To that end, this
chapter builds on the arguments developed in the previous chapters. The role of American
citizens in the U.S. policy of inaction and the possibility that citizens have a valuable perspective
strengthens the conclusion that Americans have a moral obligation.

Legal Obligations to Genocide Victims
Statements of legal obligations are useful to the present analysis but are not sufficient in
themselves to answer the question of the scope of the moral duty of American citizens to victims
of genocide. They are helpful because arguments pertaining to legal obligations are often
grounded upon assertions of moral obligation. The U.S. government's decision to ratify the
Genocide Convention was the expression of a legal obligation supported by moral claims. As
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discussed in Chapter One, the legal obligation to assist victims of genocide comes specifically
from the status of the United States as a signatory to the Genocide Convention. The Convention
itself is based on moral claims. Law represents a means by which to uphold moral standards: in
this case, to ensure that genocide is ·not carried out without intervention by the international
community.
The international community failed to uphold this legal duty, however, in the spring of
1994. Heizne describes the tendency of the international community to act in some cases, even
less severe ones, and not in others, "The use of force may acquire legality under the Charter
framework, but the Security Council has a history of failing to authorize the use of force when it
could have averted atrocities (Rwanda), while authorizing force in non-humanitarian endeavors
(first Gulf War, Afghanistan)." 176 He questions the effectiveness of the United Nations Charter,
arguing that Security Council decisions reflect the interests of the permanent member states. As
Allen Buchanan notes, "There is an unacceptable gap between what international law allows and
what morality requires." 177 These observations reveal the failure of the international community
to act in a manner required by morality. This gap points to the need to establish a moral duty
that can support the legal duty, helping to ensure that the international community in the future
acts in a manner that fulfills both.
The discussion would be inadequate if it remained only in the realm of legal obligations,
as it does not give sufficient attention to citizens, and it does not provide adequate motivation for
states (or citizens) to act against perpetrators of genocide. The discussion can now move to who
has this moral duty, and what its content is.
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Connection between Duties of the U.S. Government and Duties of U.S. Citizens
U.S. leaders took most of the blame for the country's inaction during the Rwandan
genocide. In this process of assigning blame, the connection between the duties of the U.S.
government and American ci'tizens is often forgotten or not made explicit. Certainly, there are
strong arguments in favor of the separation of role responsibility between political leaders and
"common" citizens. One could establish an argument that separated the role responsibility but
gave both political leaders and citizens an obligation to help victims of genocide. However, when
the roles are separated in this mam1er, the political leaders are the actors more closely associated
with the obligations of the United States, while the duties of citizens are not as carefully
scrutinized. What I am arguing against is not necessarily the separation ofrole responsibility,
but rather the placement of complete responsibility on leaders without consideration of the role
of citizens. My goal here is to establish the moral duty of American citizens to help others in
situations as dire as that of the Tutsis in the spring of 1994.
Barnett's "empathetic reconstmction" focuses on those in formal positions of
responsibility, such as representatives to the Security Council. 178 I find a critique ofhis
placement ofresponsibility useful to introducing my own position, as he is very careful and
deliberate with his placement ofresponsibility. Highlighting the differences helps introduce my
own position. Barnett employs the analogy of a police officer, comparing the role of a police
officer to that ofan average citizen. He argues that a person's respective level of responsibility
differs in accordance with his official position, not just his capacity to help. This supports
Barnett's rather conservative assignment of blame, as he only feels comfortable making a moral
judgment if the individual was in a position of direct responsibility during the genocide. 179
178
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Barnett explains, "Yet our notions of responsibility rest not only on causation but also on the
duties that actors are expected to perform ... Responsibility, in sh01i, is assigrred to actors who
are expected to perform specific tasks because of the role they occupy. Only a select few, and
not all, will be forever associated with the genocide." 180 This statement contains two important
elements: the notion of causation and role expectations. As he indicates, role responsibility is
connected to causation. Certainly, those individual who influence the outcome of the event in
question are seen as more responsible, since their actions are directly linked. I agree with this
explanation ofresponsibility, but disagree with the actors whom Barnett considers causally
linked. As shown in Chapters Two and Three, the actions (or inactions) of Americans citizens
did indeed have a causal role on U.S. policy decisions, which in tum contributed to the world's
failure to respond to the genocide. Barnett's second condition for assigning responsibility is role
expectations. American citizens are expected to take an active role in the American democratic
system. Although many fail to do this, that may be the result of inaccurate ideas of role
expectations rather than a correct placement of responsibility. I contend that many more than a
"select few" should be associated as responsible for the genocide. Because of its nature,
genocide involves even onlookers without formal role responsibility-everyone who is able is
obliged to assist. Therefore, while an individual's formal role impacts his responsibility,
responsibility should not be limited to those in positions of formal leadership.As members of a
democracy, American citizens do have a role in U.S. policy decisions.
While on one level Power's A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide is a
criticism of the U.S. government's policy decisions, she widens the responsibility: "We have all
been bystanders to genocide." 181 As Power indicates, the American citizens have been
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bystanders to genocide. The responsibility of the U.S. government is simply a recognition of the
collective duties of individual citizens. Social contract theory supports this claim.
Social contract theory is based on the view that the United States government as an
institution represents the moral duties shared by all Americans: According to John Locke, the
people entrust the government with responsibility, and the government is dependent on acting
with the consent of the people. Locke defines political society as a compact between the
individuals that make up the community. 182 Thus, the power of political leaders is a derivative of
the collective power of the citizens who elected those leaders. In other words, the obligations of
the government are the obligations of the citizens. The role of the government is to cairy out
these obligations. This does not mean, however, that the government should be left to carry out
these responsibilities without the involvement of the citizens. Citizens must remain engaged so
that they can provide a voice to show the government how to act, even in questions of foreign
policy. _Although modem globalization complicates social contract theory, the same basic
principles hold true. International law becomes domestic law once it is signed by the United
States. Therefore, when the United States ratified the Genocide Convention, American citizens
also gave their consent, albeit implicitly, to be bound by the constraints of this international
treaty.
Placing the full burden of moral obligation on the U.S. government is problematic for
another reason. Asserting that the United States has a moral duty without showing the basis for
this assertion-the collective duties of the people-places too much agency on the government.
It assumes duties are dictated by the state. Assigning the state responsibility absent from
participation on the part of the citizens increases the likelihood that the United States will fail to
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cany out these duties. In addition, unless citizens demand otherwise, leaders tend to assume
naITow national interests. In this sense, politicians take actions that are of explicit and obvious
benefit to their constituents. However, American citizens, as citizens of the world, may feel a
broader moral obligation.
In the following sections, explanation of the moral duty of American citizens tied to
explanation of the appropriate moral duty of the United States as a government. This is
primarily because, as shown above, the obligations of the government are synonymous with the
obligations of citizens, and also because there is some question as to whether the responsibilities
of the United States as a nation is even the correct category with which to analyze our moral
obligations to one another as members of the human race.

The Moral Duty of American Citizens:
The Nature of Genocide and Why it Carries Moral Duties
The crime in question, genocide, is such an atrocious c1ime that there is little debate over
its placement as the greatest violation of human rights and the resultant moral and legal
obligation that comes with it. The nature of the crime narrows the range of acceptable
explanations ofresponsibility. A description of the nature of genocide and why it is considered
such a terrible crime sets the stage to introduce moral theories that support the claim that
American citizens have a duty to help.
The Genocide Convention and related international law use precise and narrow
definitions of genocide purposefully, so as to keep the classification to the specific crime and not
put undo burden on the nation state. The International Commission of Intervention and State
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Sovereignty 2002 report states that nations have a "responsibility to protect." 183 This means the
international community has both the right and responsibility to intervene in cases of large-scale
loss of life or large-scale ethnic cleansing. Although there is an appropriate and necessary role
for national political il)terests in the cmTent political system of sovereign nation-states, there is
also a limit to the appropriate sphere of these interests. Genocide is an egregious violation of the
most basic of human rights. The special classification of this crime reflects an important moral
classification. This moral classification is based on the limited definition of genocide and the
threat that stems from this definition.
Alain Destexhe's argument for why genocide deserves special classification echoes the
defense that Ralph Lemkin offered during his efforts toward the passage of the Genocide
Convention, "It is the first and greatest of the crimes against humanity because of its scale and
the intent behind it: the destruction of a group. It is, therefore, a c1ime that obliges the
international community to respond: The elimination of any group that is representative of the
human race must affect the whole human race." 184 Lemkin's explanation makes several different
claims here, all of which help clarify why genocide carries such a distinct moral obligation.
First, note its description as the "first and greatest of the crimes against humanity." Its placement
in this position helps explain why the arguments of different philosophical backgrounds come to
the same conclusion: it is a crime against all of humanity. The combination of the scale and the
intent behind genocide are what make it the most severe crime against humanity. The intent is to
exterminate members of a group because of their position as members of that group. The scale is
such that the whole group is targeted, again, because of their designation as members of that
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group. In the case of Rwanda, perpetrators extended their list of targets to those who had some
Tutsi heritage, or were Hutu but were seen as connected with Tutsis.
Description still does not answer the question of why this is the most serious of the crimes

against humanity, however. The reasoning most often used in defense of this placement is the

common fear that stems from another individual being threatened solely because he is a member
of a particular group. This reasoning can be somewhat difficult to pinpoint. Martin Niemoller

famously commented, "First they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out-because I was not
a Jew. Then they came for the communists, and I did not speak out-because I was not a
communist. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out-because I was not a
trade unionist. Then they came for me-and there was no one left to speak out for me." 185 This
syndrome places genocide in a special category. Destexhe appropriately recognizes the human
cost is so high that it affects every member of the human race. Although he gives primary
agency to the states that signed the Genocide Convention, he calls the failure to uphold these
standards a "huge moral setback for the whole human race." 186 · Note the connection between
the Genocide Convention, a legal document, and the placement of genocide as a moral setback
In addition, perhaps the most important component ofDestexhe's condemnation is his inclusion
of every member of the human race in the failure to act in Rwanda. This connects the severity of
the crime to the responsibility of individuals to prevent it. It is this connection that I hope to
explore later in the chapter, through applying both deontological and consequentalist arguments
to the question of whether American citizens have a duty to intervene in cases of genocide.
There is some disagreement over which of the events of the twentieth properly fit under
the classification genocide. Destexhe argues that there have been only three genocides in the
185
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twentieth century: the murder of the Aimenians by the Turks in the Ottoman Empire, the Nazi
Holocaust, and Rwanda. He makes an important distinction, "The specific meaning [of
genocide] has been watered down, taken out of context, and tiivialized ... there is a difference
between a civilian killed in an air raid or from cholera in a refugee camp and one deliberately
chosen for death on the grounds of being born a Jew or a Tutsi." 187 Power would disagree with
Destexhe' s argument that the events in Cambodia and Yugoslavia were not genocide. She would
agree, however, the genocide is such a horrific crime that it deserves a special, very specific
classification. Melvern also criticizes overuse of the term: "We have lost the meaning of the
word, and yet no more heinous crime exists. Nothing is graver in the criminal sense than a
deliberate state policy to exterminate a people on the basis of their ethnic identity. Under
international law the crime of genocide is considered the most serious crime against humanity.
Genocide is at the apex of international human law." 188 Melvern views genocide as such a
serious crime that she voices the need to limit the classification. Despite these important
disagreements, even under the most restricted applications of the classification of genocide,
Rwanda is included. Along with the murder of the .Aimenians in 1916-1917 and the Jews in the
1930s and 1940s, the killings in Rwanda were genocide by all scholarly definitions.
The extreme nature of genocide calls for a specific classification of the corresponding
moral duty. Nicholas Wheeler's principle of "solidarism," if extended from the focus on the
government to the level of citizens, offers a valuable ptinciple on which a theory of moral duty
can be properly based. It places a careful limit on justified partiality: "Humanitarian intervention
is a moral duty in cases of what I call 'supreme humanitarian emergencies. '" 189 Wheeler is
mistaken, however, in his placement of who has the duty. He explains, "The challenge for
is1 Ibid.
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politicians, NGOs, media, and concerned citizens committed to human rights is to ensure that
governments do not evade this responsibility and are always held accountable for their actions in
dealing with regimes that egregiously violate human rights." 190 While this explanation of
responsibility c01Tectly points out that citizens play a role in making sure governments cairy
through with this duty, it fails in its labeling of the responsibility on the government. The act of
humanitarian intervention falls on the government, but the motivation for and determination of
this action is properly placed on citizens. As explained in the discussion of social contract
theory, the government is simply an expression of this responsibility. Wheeler describes the
state as a strncture that frames the agency of a particular individual. It may frame it, but it
should not reduce or detract from this agency. Failing to recognize this agency can lead to
serious failures of the system to uphold ethical standards, as the genocide in Rwanda
demonstrates. Appeals to both deontological and consequentalist arguments suppo1i this limited
placement of moral duty in "supreme humanitarian emergencies." While these respective
philosophies may support an interpretation of more expansive moral duty, my focus here is on
the specific and limited humanitarian emergency of genocide.

Limitations ofAppeals to Compassion and Enlightened Self-interest
Expressions of the need to help genocide victims often focus on appeals to compassion or
e nlightened self-interest. The respective appeals have a firm basis and seem commonsensical.
The appeal to compassion utilizes our emotions to inspire a certain feeling toward victims of
genocide. The argument for enlightened self-interest has several kinds of support. The most
frequent assertion is that allowing perpetrators of genocide to carry out these acts anywhere is
dangerous, as it could be a possible threat to the interests as the members of the United States.
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The genocide in Rwanda provided a test of these two claims, and both failed to generate action
on behalf of the Tutsis. I explain their respective failures to demonstrate the benefits of an
appeal to moral duty, which I will expand upon in the following section. Grounding the moral
obligation on the moral duty to act in cases of genocide avoids _some of the problems inherent in
an appeal to compassion or argument for enlightened self-interest.
That said, the important task at hand is inspiring citizens to act in cases of genocide for
whatever moral _reasons will move them to action. Therefore, regardless of the motivation, if the
action is directed to that end, it is a wotihy goal. Thus, while I intentionally point out some of
the flaws in the arguments for compassion and enlightened self-interest, I also acknowledge the
praiseworthy attempt to reach the same goals as those I put forth in this paper. They are
beneficial in so far as they successfully require this moral obligation. I appeal to a moral duty
because I believe that the obligation is sufficiently strong to accord the proper moral obligation
to act in the case of genocide.
The argument for compassion appeals to emotions of kindness and sympathy to elicit
feelings of obligation. Television images and newspaper pictures often appeal to compassion.
Kofi Annan, as cited earlier in this chapter, referenced pictures_ of suffering Rwandans and
expressed frustration that if these types of images did not inspire action then he was not sure
what could. This is exactly the problem, however. Such pictures do not guarantee recognition of
the obligation to assist the victims. Depending on compassion for others to motivate action is
insufficient, as emotions of compassion are dependant on the position of the actor relative to the
person in need. Martha Nussbaum explains the role of compassion, ..Thus compassion serves a
psychological link between our own self-interest and the reality of another person's good or
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ill." 191 While she believes compassion provides the best source of motivation to act, she use s the
genocide as an example of the limits of compassion, "When genocide was afoot in Rwanda, our
own sense of self-sufficiency and invulnerability stopped us from imagining the Rwandans as
people who might be with us; we were therefore culpably inactive toward them." 192 She
expresses disappointment in the American response, "The genocide in Rwanda didn't even work
up enough emotion to prompt humanitarian intervention." 193 The very fact that the genocide
failed to provoke an emotional response reveals the limits of compassion. The genocide in
Rwanda was a horrible tragedy, and still American citizens were not motivated to the point of
taking action. While American citizens should show more sympathy toward victims of
genocide, it seems that feelings of compassion are too bounded by personal position to appeal to
it as the primary source of support for why U.S. citizens have a moral obligation. Perhaps as
Americans begin to recognize and accept their duty to victims of genocide we will be more
influenced by compassion. Nussbaum writes, "Things that occasion a strong emotion in us are
things that con-espond to what we have invested with importance in our account to ourselves that
is worth pursuing in life." 194 Compassion may serve to complement the understanding of moral
duty, but it should not be argued for in the absence of the argument for moral duty.
Scholars argue the assisting Rwandans during the genocide would have fallen within the
enlightened self-interest of the United States, as it would help reduce long-term dangers and
strengthen international security. Des Forges, McConnick, and Burkhalter each explain that the
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killers were watching the reactions of the international community closely. 195 The inaction of
the international community encouraged the perpetrators to continue with the genocide.
The remoteness of Rwanda makes intervention difficult to support from the point of view
of enlightened self-interest, however. Although nations did not feel sufficiently motivated to act
during the genocide, some strong arguments support the assertion that early intervention would
have been in the best interest of the international community. The sequence of events in Rwanda
reveals that this argument may not work in all cases. Leaders have competing interests. The
enlightened self-interest of securing the safety of Tutsis threatened by extermination did not have
a direct tie to economic or political interests and therefore could be ignored at no harm to the
leader. In fact, leaders may have been risking more by responding to the genocide, as explained
in Chapters Two and Three, because of adverse public opinion concerning peacekeeping
missions at the time. As Power points out, the system works: perhaps it was that international
leaders did not comprehend future problems, but it is more likely that they did understand, and
what they understood was that perpetrators of the genocide were not a tbreat. 196 Those who
planned the genocide had a specific goal-eliminate the Tutsis and moderate Hutus-and they
were willing to do what it took. This goal was internal, and it did not seem that the perpetrators
would move beyond the borders of the state. Therefore, it would be difficult to use the argument
for enlightened self-interest to prove the responsibility of the United Sates to intervene.

Deontological and Consequentalist Foundations
The assertion that American citizens have a moral obligation to help victims of genocide
can be supported by both deontological and consequentalist arguments. While the respective
195
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moral frameworks approach the question from different angles, they anive at the same
conclusion: in the extreme situation of genocide, the duty to act in cases of moral obligation may
be logistically difficult and require the sacrifice oflesser interests, but it is nonetheless important
and still required. Neither the failure of others to act nor the location of Rwanda as a tiny
country on the other side of the world counts as an excuse or decreases the extent of their moral
obligation. Both deontological and consequentalist frameworks exert a fairly strict duty to act,
which could certainly be extended beyond action in times of genocide. For the purposes of the
present discussion, however, I only aim to outline duties as they relate to the obligation of
American citizens to the victims of genocide.
John Rawls's argument, deeply indebted to Kantianism, provides a helpful deontological
argument in support of the moral duty of American citizens to assist victims of genocide.
Although my placement of responsibilily is more focused on the followers than is Rawls' s, his
arguments suppo1i the assertion that American citizens have a duty to assist victims of genocide.
In The Law ofPeoples, Rawls extends his ideas ofjustice as fairness to the realm of
intemational law and politics. Through the use of images of a realistic utopia, Rawls provides a
clear answer to the question of the appropriate blameworthiness of the United States for the 1994
genocide in Rwanda. His portrayal ofthe Law of Peoples as a realistic utopia provides a helpful
structure for searching for a better world while acknowledging the realities that restrict these
efforts. Rawls states that a realistic justice can be achieved through the law, and that a utopian
justice is guided by ideals of a "reasonable and justsociety." 197 This blend ofrealism and
idealism strengthens his theory and increases its application to the present study.
Rawls maintains the domestic realm as the basis from which theories ofjustice grow.
The first original position is only applicable to the society within which the individual is placed.
197
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He accepts Immanuel Kant's idea, "We are to begin with the social contract idea of the liberal
political conception of a constitutionally democratic regime and then extend it by introducing a
second original position at the second level, so to speak, in which representatives of liberal
peoples make an agreement with other liberal peoples." 198 This idea stems from the assumption
that a world government would fail, and thus the global level carmot be tbe starting point for
developing ideas ofjustice as fairness. His placement of domestic politics as the basic level
seems an appropriate decision given the current division of the world into distinct nation-states
and minors the approach I employ here.
Rawls offers eight principles of the Law of Peoples that he developed from historical
events and the tenets of international law. The one most relevant to the present analysis states,
"Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent
their having a just or decent pohtical and social regime." 199 Rawls labels states holding these
unfavorable conditions as "burdened states." He furthers specifies that this duty to assistance
only applies in so far as the burdened states are aided in the transition to a society that enables
the establishment of either liberal peoples or decent peoples. In addition, he limits his use of
h uman rights to apply only to "a special class of urgent rights," which includes "the security of
ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide."200 Rawls believes that both liberal peoples and
decent hierarchical peoples will support his use of human rights. The genocide in Rwanda falls
under the "special class of urgent rights.'' The existence of human rights violations reveals that
Rwanda did not have a 'just or decent political or social regime," and thus would be classified as
a burdened state. Therefore, other nations (liberal peoples and decent hierarchical peoples)
would have a duty to assist Rwanda.
198
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Rawls concludes with the prediction that the duty to intervene is one of the principles
most likely to be violated. He cites the unfamiliarity and distance of foreign societies as the
primary explanation for why liberal peoples fail to recognize and act against human rights
violations, "A statesman may find it difficult to convince public opinion in his or her own people
of the enonnous importance to them of enabling other societies to establish at least decent
political and social institutions."201 In making this statement, Rawls is clear in his asse1tion that
it is the responsibility of the leader to at least try to uphold the principles of the Laws of Peoples,
while convincing his followers that they should do likewise. The leader has the role of trying to
convince the people of why the moral obligation is important, but the burden ofresponsibility is
inclusive of all the members of the society. Raw ls' s prediction has proven true, as demonstrated
by the failure to intervene in Rwanda. This reveals that the duty is not necessarily easy to adhere
to: there are barriers, such as the difficulty of identifying with and feeling compassion for others,
as Rawls points out. These barriers, however, do not weaken the demand of the duty.
Consequentalist theories anive at moral judgments based on the outcome of the action in
question. Utilitarianism, a type of consequentalist theory, judges the outcome by utility, or which
action. will result in the greatest good for the greatest number. Utilitarian philosopher Peter
Singer's arguments provide an interesting comparison to Rawls's. Although Singer uses a
different basis of judgment, he arrives at the same conclusion-American citizens have a duty to
assist genocide victims.
Singer's arguments can be applied to the world's current system of nation-states, but,
unlike Rawls, he calls for a "redefinition of state sovereignty." 202 Singer challenges Rawls's
model, stating that it resembles an "international order" instead of Singer's preferred model, a
201
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"global order."203 Singer explains, "From a moral point of view, the development of the world
into a 'global village' has made an important, though still umecognized, difference to our moral
situation. "204 The implication most relevant to the present study is that Americans can no longer
use their geographical location as a justification for ignorance or inaction . Singer recognizes the
cunent system of nation-states, with leaders whose role responsibility is to care first and
foremost about their citizens. He then questions the limits of this justified paiiiality, "Is the
division of the world's people into sovereign nations a dominant and unalterable fact oflife?
Here our thinking has been affected by the horrors of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. In Rwanda,
a United Nations inquiry took the view that 2,500 military personnel, given the proper training
and mandate, could have saved 800,000 lives."205 Singer explains that while leaders are justified
in some degree of prioritization of national interests, there is a limit to this plioritization.
Rwanda is an example that exceeds this limit.
Singer argues, "The U.N. should, within the limits of its capacities, authorize intervention
to stop crimes against humanity, where it can reasonably expect to do so without doing greater
hann than it prevents. This suggests not only a right to intervene, but in appropriate
circum stances, a duty to intervene."206 Singer believes the UN. should be the primary actor in
order to prevent conflict s of interest among the countries. Although directed at the United
Nations, this utilitarian claim provides a useful framework to begin the analysis of tbe moral duty
of American citizens. This line of argument is similar to that of Rawls in that it asserts that
intervention in the case of genocide is both justified and required. The apparent difference
between Singer's assignment of respon sibility and my focus on the United States is easily
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resolved. The United States had an active role in detennining U.N. decisions during the
genocide. As a member state, the United States is part of the United Nations. In much the same
way that American citizens make up the basis of the U.S. government, member states are the
body of the U.N. Therefore, partial responsibility for the actions of the U.N. falls on the U.S.,
which in turn falls back on American citizens. That stated, the discussion can turn back to the
task of assessing the duty of Ameiican citizens.
Judging the obligation of the United States to act during genocide through Singer's
utilitarian stance involves weighing the costs and benefits of intervention with the costs and
benefits of inaction. In the case of Rwanda, even if the interests of Americans are given much
higher concern than those of Rwandans, a utilitarian argument would conclude that intervening
in Rwanda would have produced greater overall utility than that consequences of inaction.
Therefore, one would conclude that intervention was justified and required.
Singer would say, and I would agree, that citizens have responsibility to care for other
citizens in the world. Although his focus in One World is the United Nations, Singer certainly
does·not neglect to emphasize the importance of individual responsibility in other works. In his
article entitled "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Singer uses the 1971 East Bengal Famine,
which generated an enormous refugee problem, to show the duties of citizens of advanced
nations. He places blame on citizens as well as governments, as famines can be stopped but the
Bengalis were not helped, or at least not before nine million were displaced. Singer's treatment
of the world as a "global village" disregards arguments that individuals are only capable of
helping individuals within their society. He makes an important claim, "If it is in our power to
prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral
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importance, we ought, morally to do it."207 He recognizes that this is a very demanding theory of
obligation, and so loosens of comparable moral importance to morally significant. He notes,
"This principle makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could
possibly do anything and in cases in which I am just one among millions in the same
position."208 Singer admits that this aspect has an effect psychologically on feelings of guilt, but
argues that it should not affect the moral principle. Therefore, even though millions of American
citizens did not act during the Rwandan genocide, each individual citizen is just as morally
responsible as he would be if he were the only person in the position to offer assistance.
Singer does not consider acting within the bounds of national interests to be a reasonable
excuse. His belief in the equality of human beings and method of weighing moral importance
reveals that he would not accept nation states avoiding responsibility based on the claim that
their national interests were of a greater impo1iance than those of Rwandan citizens, especially
because of the great utility produced at the low cost. Americans can be more concerned with
national interests, just as a mother can be more concerned with her daughter, and be morally
justified in following these interests. However, in cases of genocide, the pressing duty is to help
victims, which can override narrow national interests. In this case, the greater utility would be
served by helping Rwandans. Goodin argues that special duties to certain people derive from
basic duties for everyone-just divided responsibility-so these can be overridden it a pressing
basic duty comes up. He cites Rwanda as an example: "If duties we owe families, friends, and
fellow citizens derive their moral force from the duties we owe to human beings in general, 'then
they are susceptible to being overridden ( at least at the margins, or in exceptional circumstances)
by those more general considerations.' A very strong case can be made that humanitarian
207
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catastrophes such as the Rwandan genocide are just these sorts of 'exceptional
circumstances. "'209
Like Rawls, Singer admits that it is difficult to convince individuals to accept
responsibility for members of other countries. He explains the effect that an individual's
location in a society has on his understanding of morality: "Moral attitudes are shaped by the
needs of a society, and no doubt society needs people who will observe the rules that make social
existence tolerable. From the point of view of a particular society, it is essential to prevent
violations of norms against killing, stealing, and so on. It is quite inessential, however, to help
people outside one's own society." 210 Singer labels this explanation, rather than justification.
Morality demands that we act in a manner that will at least meet minimal requirements such as
assuring that members of other countries are not purposefully slaughtered. Other scholars point
out similar difficulties of convincing Americans to accept this placement of moral obligation,
which comes at least partially from the advantaged position of Americans. Barnett asserts that
the United States was hesitant to pass the Genocide Convention, "Genocide prevention was a
low priority in the United States, and international law offered few rewards to the most powerful
nation on earth." 211 Power supports this claim in her statement that the treaty took so long to be
ratified because it did not "promote pleasure or profit for Americans."212 Power cites U.S.
officials who are critical of the nan-ow vision of cost-benefit analysis as it is applied to human
rights, arguing that it reflects an overly high prioritization of U.S. interests and the false
assumption that the loss of human life in a country such as Rwanda does not affect the United
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States. 213 Establishing a moral duty to intervene in the case of genocide does not require that
U.S. citizens view a Rwandan life as equal to that of an Arne1ican, but simply that helping
victims of genocide is more important than some other concerns.
Singer's utilitarian argument, although based on a different premise than Rawls's, arrives
at a similar moral obligation. Like Rawls, he emphasizes that moral obligations are what
individuals should do, even if the action is outside what individuals are normally inclined to do.
He recognizes that living a moral life may include choices that are difficult and impose on the
interests of individuals (or collective political entities, such as nation states). Distance from an
individual in need does not lessen their obligation. 214 Although they were thousands of miles
from Rwanda, American citizens had a moral obligation to help. The form of assistance that
they can offer is quite different than that of leaders such as President Clinton or Madeline
Albright, but they share in the duty to assist nonetheless.

The Specific Duties of the United States as the World's Superpower
The United States, including its government and citizens, is even more obliged morally
than are other nations because ofits tremendous power and post-Holocaust pledge to the
prevention of genocide. Gourevitch speaks to the power of the United States: "One should
always remember that in the United Nations Security Council, the United States is essentially the
800-pound gorilla that sits where it wants and can bend others at its will. It's the great
power." 215 Destexhe echoes this sentiment and offers the implications, "As the lone superpower
today, the United States cannot escape the accompanying moral and political obligations to deal
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with a genocide."216 Anthony Lang offers three principles in defense of his placement of
additional responsibility on certain countries, one of which is especially applicable, "Countries
that are powerful have an obligation to aid those that are not. " 217 Similarly, Power explains that
she focused her study on the United Sates because of its status as the country with the potential
for the greatest impact, tremendous power, commitment to Holocaust education in an effo1i to
prevent its recunence, and education. 218 These arguments reflect a common expectation: the
United States should use its power to work for the interests of these causes.
However, as Lang points out, there are strong counter-arguments to the above claims:
"States are not humanitarian aid agencies that have the freedom to help every country in every
part of the world: They are political organizations whose primary responsibility is to ensure the
welfare of their citizens ... In a world where countries rule themselves, many claim that no state
is obligated to act in the interest of another. "219 Anthony Lake makes a similar argument: just
because the U.S. has the power does not mean that it should be required to use it. Recently, Lake
explained, "Our power does indeed require that we consider carefully its use in such
circumstances-and there is no doubt that the United States shares the same blame for the failure
by the international community. But the possession of such power does not bring with it an
automatic responsibility to use it."220 Barnett explains, "Can does not imply ought. Most
Americans would probably agree."221
But surely ability to intervene is somewhat connected to responsibility. Barnett is correct
in pointing out that can does not imply ought. Ought implies can. If a state such as the U.S. has
216
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e ability to intervene but neglects to do so, it needs more of a justification for this decision than
::rnld a country that did not have the capacity to intervene and so could not have had the
,portunity. The United States has the good fortune to be in a position of tremendous agency. It
ems fair to say that this role can bring with it limited correlative duties. Again, limiting the
ty to cases of genocide reconciles the opposing lines of argument. Expecting nations such as
: United States to offer resources and assistance to other countries in the case of genocide is
t expecting them to be 'humanitarian aid organizations.' The United States can keep its
ponsibilityto work for the interests of its citizens a top priority, and still act in cases of
reme crisis that warrant involvement.

llclusion
Genocide is a crime against humanity. It threatens the most basic of rights, the right to
Americans should act in a manner that recognizes their dutyto stop the perpetrators of
)cide. The fact that moral duties are not easy is perhaps the most important claim of the
ent chapter. This must be recognized in order for excuses for inaction to be deemed
!ceptable in the future.
When asked about the role of national interests, General Dallaire gave the following
)DSe.

I believe, as Kofi Annan has stated in the millennium speech he gave at the General
Assembly called "We, the peoples," that we have entered a millennium where in fact in
humanity, the human race, is to become the dominant factor, not the self-interest. That in
fact the 20 percent that's running away with all the marbles cannot morally continue to
do it when 80 percent of humanity, that three year-old kid in Rwanda that was grimy, that
was dirty, that was sick, flies all over him, that three-year old. That level of
consideration ofhuman life raising these countries to that level out of self-interest is, I
believe, an achievable objective in the centuries to come. 222
!laire, interview by Ted Koppel.
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The demand that American citizens recognize and act on their moral duty to assist victims of
genocide is minimal, and supported by opposing philosophical perspectives. It is, simply put, the
least they can do.
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CHAPTER FIVE
"THE MILDEST AND MOST WIDESPREAD FORM OF BETRAYAL"

Valentina Iribagiza, a survivor of the genocide, recalls her honifi.c experience, "We were
pretending to be dead. They took stones and smashed the heads of bodies. They took little
children and smashed their heads together. They killed my family. I saw them kill my papa and
brother. " 223
Philip Gourevitch shares the personal testimony of a Tutsi woman, Laurencie Nyirabeza,
who managed to survive after being hit by a machete and tlu·own into a ditch. 224 She witnessed
the deaths of her entire family, ten persons in total, including her children and grandchildren.
The man who committed the crime, Girumuhatse, has since returned to her town, living among
the survivors. He asked for her forgiveness and then told her, "We'll live together as usual."225
My motive for sharing these stories arises from my fear that, in studying the Rwandan
;enocide, we fall prey to the same barriers that contributed to the world's inaction during the
�enocide. Looking back in history, even recent history, creates a distance much like that which
nterfered with the ability of Americans to identify with and feel compassion for Rwandans
luring the spring of 1994. It is too easy to study the events in Rwanda with detached sympathy,
heorizing what the role of American citizens should be in the future, without fully internalizing
.ow important it is that we follow through with these promises.
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A second phenomenon to which we, as observers and analysts, are suspectible to is the
tendency to view the events in Rwanda as a horrible tragedy that has since ended. Yes, we say to
ourselves, the international community failed and for that each of us is regretful. But reaching
that conclusion, we are tempted to put the genocide away, as a matter of the past-as a historical
event. Although the genocide has indeed ended, it is not history to the people of Rwanda. As
Laurencie's story reveals, murderers and survivors live together in the same towns. The
tremendous human cost of the deaths of so many people in such a small country continues to be
felt, and will affect Rwandan citizens for generations to come. These points are important to
remember, as the more we can close the gap, in terms of both geographical and imaginative
distance, the more promising our analysis will be. A similar genocide could well happen again
soon, somewhere, and wouldn't we act (or not act) in the same way as in 1994?
After the Holocaust, Primo Levi remarked about the power of self-deception in terrible
times, "Things whose existence is not morally comprehensible cannot exist."226 It is impossible
to understand, much less fully internalize, the suffe1ing that occmTed and still continues in
Rwanda. It seems, though, that the more we try to understand the pain, the greater the likelihood
we will respond with sympathy and courage in the future. Try for a moment to place yourself in
the life of Valentina or Laurencie. Imagine your reaction if one of your family members-a
parent, sibling, child, or spouse-were murdered by a machete while you looked on, helpless and
desperate to save your own life. Now envision witnessing several of your immediate family
members being killed in this manner. Picture surviving this tragedy, and then having to live
across the street from the person who did this to your family. This unimaginable scenario is
reality for Valentina, Laurencie, and many other Rwandans.
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Why i·s it that General Dallaire, one of the individuals who did the most to help the
Rwandans, also feels the worst? He confesses, "The impact of the trauma of Rwanda has
physically affected my brain and has put me in a state where there was no capability left ofany
desire for life, any desire to even consider life ... I have failed in my duty as the U.N. mission
commander to assist the Rwandans." 227 General Dallaire lived through the genocide, as a
witness to and actor in the events. But so did citizens of the United States. Ofcourse, persons in
positions of fomial role responsibility such as Dallaire are bound to be more affected by the
events in question. Yet his cunent level of suffering and regret, when compared to many
Americans who feel no responsibility for the genocide, is disproportionate in tenns of obligation.
Dallaire's heightened feelings oftrauma and guilt reveal the important role ofproximity. While
Americans cannot change the fact that they live their daily lives in a place far removed from the
lives of suffering Rwandans, they can change the degree of responsibility that Americans feel or
acknowledge. If we can increase the sense ofresponsibility understood by American citizens
(and citizens of all countries, for that matter), then maybe we can increase the chance of action in
future international crises.
As C.A.J. Coady points out, "Outrage is no substitute for insight. A legitimate concern
for principles needs to be anchored by the factual reality within which the principles have to
make sense and be applied."228 This is true, but it seems some sense ofoutrage is an appropriate
reaction and helps facilitate the discussion. Along those lines, I urge readers of this thesis to
recall the words ofjournalists Feral Keane, "Remember the figures, never ever forget them; in
one hundred days up to one million people were hacked, shot, strangled, clubbed, and burned to
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death. Remember, carve this into your consciousness: one million."229 This statement is

particularly poignant when taken in tandem with the words of Katelijine Hermans, a Belgian

journalist who was evacuated during the genocide, "It could have been different. But somebody
has to decide it will be different, and nobody took the decision."230

I will use this final chapter to bring together the descriptive lessons from the first three

and the prescriptive argument of the fourth. The goal ofthis chapter, as well as an overarching
theme of this work, is to question the assumption that the "somebody" who had to decide it
would be different was a leader, and therefore the rest ofus are free of obligation.
The claims of each of the preceding chapters, when added together, create a powerful set
of deductions: the United States could have acted and saved many lives but did not; U.S. leaders
heard silence, and so continued their policy of inaction; American citizens are in an
advantageous position to avoid some ofthe cognitive and volitional mistakes of political leaders;
and, finally, both the U.S. government and American citizens have a moral obligation to act
against genocide. This study of the role of U.S. citizens is a lesson in what is possible if citizens
neglect their responsibility: this claim highlights the agency of Americans and calls for higher
expectations of them to act as engaged citizens concerned with members of other countries.
Membership in the U.S. political system carries responsibilities-domestic and international
that should not be limited to individuals in positions of formal leadership.
In the earlier research stages of this project, I focused at first on the blameworthiness of
the various actors within the United States: President Clinton, his administration, mid and senior
level officials, members of Congress, and the American public. My intention was to explain the
Quoted in Pe ter Ronayne, Never Again?: The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide
Since the Holocaust (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 159. I have used the figure of800,000
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many factors that played a role in each decision made during the genocide, showing how analysts
tend to assign blame too easily and without proper consideration of the many situational
constraints under which U.S. policy decisions are made. My focus has since shifted, however,
and each chapter now reflects a deliberate attempt to avoid the topic of blameworthiness.
Ceriainly, the claim that the U.S. government and American citizens have a moral duty to act
implies a certain degree of blame when inaction occurs. The choice to avoid the careful
consideration of levels of blameworthiness for each actor was intentional. In the case of
Rwanda, I feared my conclusion would either place most of the blame on leaders or move in the
other direction and reduce U.S. blame by explaining the many variables that led leaders to act in
the manner that they did. hi his conclusion, Ronayne emphasizes that U.S. policies were one of
choice.231 This is an important point to remember. And the choice was not solely the
responsibility of the leaders-American citizens had agency, and they did not use it.

Actions Speak Louder than Words
During Rwanda, American actions did not live up to the expectation of assistance that
their words had created. An explanation of the American commitment to genocide prevention
sets the stage to emphasize their failure to live up to these standards, and sheds light on how this
lesson can help us shape a more promising future. I acknowledge that presenting evidence to
show the general support of Americans for intervention during genocide does not offer support to
the moral argument that Americans have a moral duty. As Peter Singer has observed, "Most
people could be wrong; we can't decide moral issues by taking opinion polls."232 But Singer
also states that explanation is relevant nonetheless, as it reveals the height of the bar that needs to
231
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be cleared to establish the theory as a solid argument. American commitment to genocide
preventipn and punishment places the bar fairly low.
Surveys support the claim that Ame1ican citizens believe the United States should
intervene in countries where genocide is pe1petrated. After Somalia, U.S. leaders believed the
public to be against intervention in other countiies, even in the case of Rwanda. However, CNN
and USA Today polls following the deaths of eighteen American soldiers in Somalia found that
the majority of people believed that the United States was doing the right thing in Somalia. 233
Peter Ronayne comments, "What was missing was not public support but a sustained leadership
effort to explain why the United States was in Somalia and what it was accomplishing after the
famine relief effort. Indeed, a si gnificant percentage of the American public embraces the notion
of the United States as 'the city on the hill' and believes that humanitarian actions are often in
the nation's interest." 234 A 1994 poll found that 80% of the Americans surveyed favored
intervention if the U.N. found genocide occurring in Bosnia or Rwanda. 235 A majority, 60%, was
still in support of intervention even when presented with the hypothetical of several thousand
American casualties. Thus, while the United States could certainly stand to benefit from
leadership in favor of intervention as well as an increase in American support for operations in
countries such as Rwanda, the claim that U.S. citizens have a moral obligation is not too far
removed from the verbal commitment Americans express when questioned and presented with
hypothetical situations.
After the conflict in Yugoslavia, President Clinton stated in an interview, "While there
may be a great deal of ethnic and religious conflict in the world ... whether within or beyond the
borders of a country, if the world community has the power to stop it, we ought to stop genocide
233
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and ethnic cleansing."236 Ronayne calls this statement the Clinton Doctrine, linking it back to his
assessment of American public opinion, "The language of the Clinton Doctrine resonates with
most Americans-they will not pay any price, but they will pay some p1ice in the name of
genocide prevention." 237 Ronayne focuses on leadership, believing that strong leadership from
the top can mobilize public support into action. It is also an example, however, of citizens not
following through with their professed moral values. It can be safely assumed that most
Americans watching the news thought that somebody should do something.

Excuses or Lessons?
Following the Holocaust, Americans, along with the rest of the world, said that they had
all learned an important lesson. The world learned that it was possible for humans to treat other
humans in the most horrible of ways solely on the basis of ethnicity, even in the middle of the
twentieth century. In an editorial during the Rwandan genocide, Des Forges pointed out the
failure of the U.S. to uphold the Genocide Convention, stating, "We did not learn anything from
the experience of the Holocaust."238 I disagree. We learned important lessons from the
Holocaust: genocide was possible in our modern world. In addition, we learned that we should
act faster the next time. We learned what was possible to happen, but we did not learn that we
also tend to let it happen. The lesson to be learned from Rwanda concerns our tendency to
remain silent, whether for cognitive or volitional reasons. Gourevitch summarizes this lesson
well, "I think that anybody who still believes that the world will not let it happen again, who
believes the words 'Never again,' is deluding themselves dangerously."239 That is the new
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lesson that Rwanda offers. "Never again" is verbal commitment that has failed. It is not enough
to say we will act. We must follow through with these promises. The best way to ensure that this
occurs is to realize our tendency to fail to recognize and act on these commitments when
problems arise. Both the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide taught us powerful lessons, and
we must draw from them everything we can so as to prevent such tragedies from occurring in the
twenty-first century.
Taking these lessons into account, perhaps in the future the best strategy is to assume the
worst in cases of possible or probable genocide.240 While genocide can be difficult to identify in
the early stages, weighing the possible risks of not intervening and the resultant tremendous
human loss with the risks of intervening and preventing genocide leads to the conclusion that in
most cases it is best to err on the side of caution. This is especially true given our tendency to
have trouble identifying with victims of genocide in countries far removed from our own. Ralph
Lemkin, the advocate who initiated the Genocide Convention, questioned the proximity excuse:
"If women, children, and old people were being murdered a hundred miles from here, wouldn't
you run to help? Then why do you stop this decision of your heart when the distance is 3,000
miles instead of a hundred?"241 Lemkin's logic is helpful, as we should assess this tendency.
What we should not do, however, is mistakenly assume that we will not be affected by this
problem of identifying with the victim next time. Instead, we should recognize that our feelings
of sympathy would be different if genocide occurred in Europe rather than in an African or Asian
country. This provides even more reason to compensate for this natural human tendency by
erring on the side of overreaction. This process applies the lesson of Rwanda: we tend to under
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react in response to problems in areas that are not within our narrow interests and imaginative
range. Let us not have to learn this lesson again, as it will come at tremendous human cost.
In 1967, Senator William Proxmire, who took up the Genocide Convention ratification
battle in the United States after Lemkin, stated, "They are the most lethal pair of foes for human
rights everywhere in the world-ignorance and indifference." 242 Ignorance is no longer an
excuse. Today's global world allows attentive Americans to be infonned of cases of massive
human rights abuses in even the most remote locations. In addition, their status as citizens of the
world's superpower offers them the access to national resources that would enable intervention.
This is not to say that citizens advocating for intervention guarantees U.S. action. My point is to
show that for Americans, this possibility exists, whereas it may not for citizens of countries
without the resources that enable them to offer assistance to other countries . .Americans are more
responsible because they are more able: with increased power and wealth comes increased
responsibility.
With the possibility of ignorance eliminated or at least reduced, the discussion can tum to
indifference. In the case of Rwanda, American indifference played a formative role. Consider

the following hypothetical example. Suppose one hundred individuals in each of the fifty states
wrote a letter to their Congressional representative after learning of the genocide during the
second week in April. Hearing such demands, several Congressmen were motivated to draft a
memo to the Clinton administration demanding a review of its current policy. On April 21,
instead of voting to reduce the UNAMIR mission, the administration had the confidence and
political will to advocate filling General Dallaire's request for 5,000 troops. Scholars argue that
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such a force probably would have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. 243 Think about the
implications: 5,000 letters, taking each individual no more than a few minutes to write, could
have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. That many lives would probably have been saved
with even fewer letters, but in any case the effort of writing even 5,000 letters seems a very small
cost to pay for the number of lives saved.
The purpose of this hypothetical is not to predict what would have happened. Rather, it
shows that it is easy to talk in vague tenns, saying that citizens should have acted and maybe
there would have been a different outcome. American citizens can strive to become more
educated in international affairs, take an active role in the political process, and be more
deliberate about voicing their concerns to their elected leaders. Nanowing the causation in this
manner allows Americans to understand more clearly the burden of responsibility that they
should feel. American citizens should not rely on the state to fulfill their moral obligation. To do
so would neglect their responsibility and be an example of the bystander behavior that has had
such disastrous consequences in the past.

The Need for Effective and Moral Followership
As explained in the preceding chapters, much of the blame for the Rwandan genocide
falls on the individuals in fonnal positions of leadership. James Wood, a Defense Depaiiment
official during the genocide, summarizes, "Most of all, though, it's a failure ofleadership of the
Western countries. Everybody is, 'Well, if the Belgians have bailed out, why should we do it?
Where are the French? Where's somebody else?'" 244 Woods deems the problem a failure of
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leadership and then talks only about the leaders, as do many assessments of blame. This
approach is problematic, however, because leadership is a dynamic process that cam1ot exist
apart from followers. Leaders can and should make moral decisions, but focusing solely on
leaders' decision-making overlooks the active role that followers play in the process. Leaders at
the time of the crisis, as well as scholars studying their decisions later, name the indifference of
American citizens as a key variable in the decision to ignore the problem until it was too late.
The Rwandan tragedy explicitly reveals the problems that stem from the absence of effective and
moral followership.
John Rawls recognizes the difficulties involved in convincing individuals to move
beyond their interests and follow the long-term goals ofjustice and fairness. His portrayal
assumes that self-interests are typically the driving force behind decisions, "A legitimate concern
about the duty of assistance is whether the motivational support for following it presupposes a
degree of affinity among peoples ... that cannot be expected even in a society of liberal
peoples."245 In this way, Rawls deals directly with the concept of limited compassion addressed
by philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum. He devises the ideal of the statesman to counter this
tendency and point to a leadership solution. Rawls explains, "The ideal of a statesman is
suggested by the saying: the politician looks to the next election, the statesman to the next
generation."246 In theory, the statesman leader would compensate for the tendency of individuals
to pursue their self-interests. His idea of a statesman reflects his expectation that leaders, at
least on some level, look ahead and work for the pursuit oflong-term goals interests or the
interests of members of distant countries. By strengthening "relations of affinity," peoples can
become increasingly cooperative, as their interests become supp,orted by mutual concern for one
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another. 247 Rawls uses the spread ofreligious tolerance as an example of a principle that gained
more and more suppo1i with the passage of time. He asse1is, "The relatively narrow circle of
mutually caring peoples in the world today must expand over time and never be viewed as fixed.
Gradually, peoples are no longer moved by self-interest alone or by their mutual caring· alone ...
until eventually they become ready to act on the ideals and principles their civilization
specifies."248 The ideal of a statesman presents a hopeful solution to the limits ofnarrow
interests and political reality.
Rawls's description ofthe statesman leader provides a worthy example for political
leaders to follow. This argument represents a potential counterpoint to my assertion that a
solution can, and should, be found at the level ofcitizens. However, there is something to be said
by the very occunence ofthe failure of leaders such as President Clinton to act out against
crimes of genocide in Rwanda. While the ideal ofa statesman leader has intellectual appeal, I do
not accept Rawls's placement ofresponsibility solely on the leader. I suggest that we can an-:ive
at a method of helping citizens to understand their role in the world and the impo1iance of
developing and standing by long-term goals. Political leaders are elected by today's citizens, not
by future generations. Therefore, as the policy decisions explained in the preceding chapters
confirm, the interests and goals of political leaders can only be so far removed from the interests
ofthe people that they lead. We should expect leaders to uphold standards ofjustice such as the
duty to intervene in cases of genocide, but I believe that this strategy would be far more effective
if followers had the ability and desire to understand these concerns as well. The development of
a model that helps the followers understand long-term interests and the dire situations of other
people, coupled with leaders striving to act in accordance with the model ofthe ideal statesmen,
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may be the most appropriate manner of preventing failures such as the Rwandan genocide in the
future.
Kofi Annan responded to the question "Why did not one intervene?" by saying: "The
question should not be addressed only to the United Nations, or even to its Member States. Each
of us as an individual has to take his or her share of responsibility [emphasis added]."249 Barnett
criticizes this type of apology from leaders in prominent positions such as President Clinton and
Annan, "The very individuals who made the momentous decisions were now relocating
responsibility by "democratizing" blame ... they presented themselves as emissaries of other
publics that, they insinuated, also shared responsibility. This democratization of blame, in effect,
reduced their own paiiicular culpability to a meaningless fraction."250 While it would be wrong
to allow leaders to escape responsibility, I do think that Annan 's point is justified, as he is not
"relocating responsibility," but rather, emphasizing the important truth that each ofus is
responsible. Des Forges makes this point, "Genocide anywhere implicates everyone. To the
extent that governments and peoples elsewhere failed to prevent and halt this killing campaign,
they all share in the shame ofthe crime [emphasis added]."251
Singer appropriately names the consequence of failing to act because no one else is doing
so "follow-the-crowd ethics." 252 Follow-the-crowd ethics creates bystanders who mistakenly
assume that they do not have an active role in the problem. The result of this thinking on a
collective level is that nobody takes an active role, and disasters such as the Holocaust and the
Rwandan genocide rage on until it is too late. Glover quotes Alexander Solzhenitsyn, survivor
of the terror under Stalin: "The mildest and at the same time most widespread form ofbehayal
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was not to do anything directly, but just not to notice the doomed person next to one, not to help
him, to tum away one's face, to shrink back ... You kept silence. You acted as if you had not
noticed. "253
As citizens of the most powerful country in today's global world, Americans can no
longer make the excuse, "out of sight, out of mind." Ten years ago Americans betrayed
Rwandans. Their betrayal was mild yet widespread, but had repercussions of tremendous human
cost. Each individual American most likely did not feel responsible for the genocide, but the
col1ective outcome of their bystander behavior contributed to the world's inaction. This sad truth
can serve as an inspiration: this does not have to happen next time, as American citizens have the
agency to influence U.S. foreign policy decisions.
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